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ABSTRACT
Tax Increment Financing (T.I.F.) is an instrument widely used in the United States
by municipalities to promote and encourage development and redevelopment of
blighted areas by the private sector for the public benefit.
Through research of the American use, and description of its implementation, T.I.F.
is recommended as a vehicle that should be adopted by the City of Montreal as the
catalyst to stimulate private enterprise redevelopment of the prototypical central
area badly in need of such initiative and investment; and to consequently
orchestrate the synergetic effect of the private initiative thus created.
The proposed adaptation of T.I.F. is particularly suitable at this time to achieve the
implementation of Montreal's master planning neighbourhood revitalization goals
and directives. An actual model using T.I.F., of the designated priority zone just
announced, forecasts the cash flow to become available from anticipated tax
increments through floating bonds in order to create venture capital to launch the
project.
An overview of Montreal, its evolution and planning are documented with special
attention given to the importance of the introduction of the long awaited master
plan, its clear division of neighbourhoods (or arrondissements) and those sectors
prioritized for redevelopment, form the focus of this research paper.
This paper concludes through U.S. examples and the demonstration of an actual
model, that given the present Montreal context and the City's ambitious
redevelopment goals, T.I.F. would be a viable and feasible instrument that would
efficiently and effectively act as a motivator for the private sector to participate in
achieving the public sector's redevelopment goals for blighted areas in need, that
otherwise would have no interest or hope for private sector involvement or
investment; but that with T.I.F., does offer market potential under conditions of
significant redevelopment.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Thomas Robert Reiner, with the submission of this thesis will be completing the
final requirements for his Masters Degree, from the Center of Real Estate
Development at the MASSACHUSETTS. INSTITUTE of TECHNOLOGY, the
formalization and synthesis of an 18 year career in the real estate industry as a
consultant development architect and practicing real estate developer.
The political and consequently pessimistic financial climate throughout his career
has inspired a constant view to alternate economies and markets, so as to use the
lessons of those experiences and adapt them to and for Montreal. Tax Increment
Financing is among the most exciting and current such idea, which the author is
introducing into Montreal by the present, in the anticipation that it will be the very
instrument that revitalizes Montreal through the T.I.F. model, for the repopulation
of blighted peripheral areas of downtown and beyond.
Something of a pioneer in architecture for residential development in bringing
design into the common place affordable housing market, Reiner's orientation
during his McGill University Architecture days, some twenty plus years ago, in
concentrating on development resulted in his barely obtaining his Bachelor of
Architecture in (1972) following an earlier degree, Bachelor Science (Arch.) 1970.
Notwithstanding any academic hardships, Reiner was invited back some 10 years
later to the departments of Architecture and Urban Planning in McGill University
and Universite de Montreal to share his practical residential design and
development knowledge on several occasions.
Practicing architecture as the principal of his own firm since 1974, and now licensed
in New York and Ontario as well, the office of Thomas Robert Reiner Architects,
TRRiA, has had a dominant role in Montreal over the years, mostly in housing.
Winner of 26 sites in the City's design competitions in the 80's resulting in the
realization of thousands of houses and condominiums throughout the Montreal
region, the strength of the firm has led to the expansion into related real estate
development in the mid '80s, and both operations are simultaneously progressing as
individual ongoing entities. In addition to the responsibilities of these dual careers,
Reiner has participated on several community planning boards, and has served on,
numerous other construction related boards and committees.
Like many practicing architects, a fact certainly not unrelated, Reiner is divorced.
However he is also enriched with a heritage of three outstanding children, Daniel,
David and Joanna. With his relentless pursuit of no less than two concurrent and
overlapping careers, the kids have had to participate in a effervescent lifestyle.
Having married Kayla Samuels in 1991 after her completion of a Master's degree in
Urban Planning from McGill University, they now combine their efforts in the
TRRiA Group of Companies on a daily basis. Their first child together, anticipated
just after the MIT Convocation in the fall of 1992, is expected to join the Firm as an
apprentice shortly after birth.
i;'
DEDICATIONS
To Joanna, David, Daniel, and Kayla, who each at their own time and in their own
way suffered from my academic venture. I hope that they share whatever pride I
now feel and that it shall consequently be inspired to pursue relentlessly, all of their
own goals and aspirations.
To my parents and to whatever satisfaction they may deservedly have in having
delivered their child from the Hungarian Revolution all the way to the revered halls
of MIT. The voyage only took 44 years.
I love you all.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Leading a long list of those who have been instrumental in my preparation of this
thesis is Montreal's Mayor, Jean Dore, who upon a verbal presentation of the
theme, became sufficiently enthusiastic that the possibility of its current
implementation through his belief and support, fueled my energy to keep reading,
thinking and writing.
Secondarily, though the ranking may be controversial, is heartfelt thanks to my wife
Kayla Samuels-Reiner, who as an urban planner and day to day professional
colleague and personal partner contributed in invaluable ways, the most meaningful
and volatile perhaps, were the series of challenges and criticisms that she had
persistently levelled at the initial thoughts and drafts. As such, part of the following
belongs to her.
I would also like to thank M. Roland Grenier, formerly of the City of Montreal's
Real Estate Department and now in the private sector, directing certain joint
(private-public) development ventures for International Parking Inc.. His patience
in communicating the essence of many published documents and their practical
background and potential is essential to the understanding of the City urban
evolution and present direction. Also, M. Fabien Cournoyer of the Housing &
Urban Development Department of the City, who is entrusted with the Faubourg St.
Laurent project. Hopefully, this thesis will be generally valuable to him in that
mandate as Mr. Cournoyer's sharing of ideas and strategies was to my preparation
and conclusions.
I also wish to thank Ms. Kathryn DiCristina for American research material that she
had brought to my attention, and my brother Peter Reiner who had done the same
in Montreal. Additional emphasis, Marcel Prefontaine; whose dedication and
thoroughness with the City documents and data were the point of reference upon
which basis the Montreal and its T.I.F. prototype chapter was structured.
Making possible the time devoted to my academic year at MITand thesis research
and preparation, was my Montreal architect-associate, Robert Jerome, whose
dedication, loyalty and support were exceeded only by his enormous mental and
physical strength in carrying the weight of the Montreal, operations on a daily basis.
Many people whom I have met at MIT made a permanent imprint on my
professional thoughts, due to their combined professional and academic brilliance.
In that context I highlight Jim Becker, Mike Wheeler, Larry Susskind and Bill
Wheaton. To be added to the above in their achievements, but of special
importance to my thinking and increasing urban sensitivity which emanate from
conversations with and appreciation of the work and thoughts of Gary Hack and his
most relevant lectures with Rick Lamb.
After the year, it is now clear that I can thank the 1991-92 Director of the Center,
Larry Bacow who in a private meeting a week prior to the start of school inspired
enough interest, anticipation and confidence to overcome my fears of embarking
upon my third career direction, which at that time, neither of us knew would prove
to be simultaneous. But with the help of Maria Vieira, Kent Roberts and a very
wonderful and understanding small group of people within a very special Class who
particularly offered moral and academic support throughout the year, I will now
have succeeded in this challenge -one that my recognized and accomplished in-laws
stimulated through their joint and dual careers as high profile lawyers and
diplomats.
It maybe an obvious classic to acknowledge and thank one's thesis advisor and
supervisor. However, Dr. Richard Schramm, of the MIT Urban Studies and
Planning Department was in my opinion special, in his stimulating contribution and
in his abilitiy to direct my thoughts and energies to the relevant issues. He also
went out of his way, often literally, to help structure somewhat academically, my
entrepreneurial exuberance and overwhelming to implement Montreal's TIF
immediately, and virtually single -handedly.
Thanks.
VI.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
DEDICATIONS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
PREFACE
CHAPTER 1:
CHAPTER 2:
CHAPTER 3:
CHAPTER 4:
INTRODUCTION
Table 1: Brief Overview Of Montreal In A Historical Context
FINANCING REDEVELOPMENT THROUGH T.I.F.
The Methodology of T.I.F.
A Brief History of T.I.F.
The Implementation Of T.I.F.
Minnesota
Wisconsin
California
Implementation of T.I.F. In Montreal Context
Conclusion
TAX INCREMENT FINANCING
How Should It Be Done ?
Steps for Setting up a T.I.F. Program
THE T.I.F. PROJECT IN MONTREAL; ITS CREATION,
COMMENTARY AND DISCUSSION
The T.I.F. Expert-Consultant
The T.I.F. Administration In Montreal
The Exact Limits Of The Site And Its Tax Base
Choosing And Working With Private Enterprise
The T.I.F. Program And Fund
The Potential Market of the T.I.F. Site
The T.I.F. Subsidies
The Private-Public Development Agreement
ii-iii
v-vi
1-4
5-19
18-19
20-30
21
23
24
25
27
28
30
30
31-36
31
34
38-55
39
40
41
45
50
51
52
53
CHAPTER 5: THE MONTREAL T.I.F. CASE STUDY; FAUBOURG
ST. LAURENT
Current Property Values And Tax Reveue
Anticipated Increased Property Values:
SHDU Sites vs. The Enlarged Proposed T.I.F. Zone
Bond Value Of the Incremental Tax
City Expenses For the Creation Of Such T.I.F. Zone
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
APPENDICES:
APPENDIX 1: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
OF MONTREAL
APPENDIX 2: MONTREAL A STATISTICAL &
DEMOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW
56-66
57
61
63
64
65
67-72
86-152
73-85
86-100
APPENDIX 3: FAUBOURG ST. LAURENT - PLANS &
PICTURES; THE T.I.F. ZONE & THE SHDU SITE
101-108
APPENDIX 4: THE SHDU SITE; DETAILED CITY
DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS 109-125
APPENDIX 5: THE MONTREAL ECONOMIC T.I.F.
MODEL BASED ON U.S. STRUCTURE 126-142
APPENDIX 6: THE CONSEQUENT BOND VALUE
AND ITS INCENTIVE USE 143-152
BIBLIOGRAPHY
V//
Tax increment financing acknowledges certain commonalities, such as the fact that
blight and decay exist in our cities-either as a function of natural deterioration or
because businesses move out of the city to escape municipal taxes, crime and other
urban problems.
It acknowledges unemployment-unemployment as a function ofjob scarcities, and as a
function of people being held hostage due to inadequate mass transportation. Also, it
acknowledges an uneven distribution in contributions made to the tax base. Developed
areas of our cities are contributing their fair share to the cost of city services, but
dilapidated areas are not contributing.
And finally, tax increment financing acknowledges the fact that cities cannot
accomplish redevelopment by themselves; that it will take a marriage between business
and local government to provide the incentives necessary to eradicate urban blight.
( Wolens, 1982 )
PREFACE
Montreal has been generally neglected from its downtown outwards... and the
outlook for its growth is bleak. Concentrated study by an urban planning-minded
City Administration suggests its revitalization be brought about through in-fill
development and redevelopment, mostly through the re-introduction of reasonably
priced housing with the expectation that commercial and service industries will
naturally follow.
As outlined in the recently publicized and soon to be implemented master plan,
research and urban design principles have pointed to the prototypical and priority
development in the downtown zone along the famed and symbolic St. Laurent
Boulevard. This symbolical and physical dividing line represents the delineation of
the French and the English sectors of town. Moreover, this Boulevard is within the
heart of the red light district and virtually adjacent to the central business district of
Montreal. Its redevelopment is strategic, essential and symbolic in uniting the City,
even if somewhat optimistic, because more desirable areas themselves remain
unbuilt.
The present Montreal context and its short and medium term urban and economic
forecast is not an optimistic one. A recessionary lack of growth, insecurity
regarding employment, relatively difficult access to affordable homeownership, and
the recent more cumbersome project approval process ( fraught with excessively
integrative urban planning at the expense of project feasibility and somewhat overly
exuberant citizen participation reviews ), have all worked against the motivation of
private investment development in Montreal. Consequently, the absence of private
investment has been somewhat compensated by para-municipal organizations both
for social and free market projects, an unfair competition that further alienates
private enterprise and reduces private investment as urban land prices are
overestimated and overpaid by the para-public organizations.
To revitalize the city's decaying areas, and to re-create a balance wherein the private
sector is an active participant in the forming of a vibrant development and
redevelopment process, serious public stimuli and long term commitments are
required. Previous programs from different levels of government have had the
effect of boosting construction, and populating under-utilized or vacant areas.
Those programs, however, were general in nature, and not initiated or in response
to a need for redevelopment of and development in specific planned zones or
communities. Ideally, a more responsive program should be created, where funds
earned and collected from a designated zone or community, are specifically
available as required, and designated for the impetus and investment of a
conscientious and holistic redevelopment in the very zone from which it was
accumulated. Such a program is the essence of Tax Increment Financing (T.I.F.).
T.I.F. might prove to be a very viable program to achieve the desired
redevelopment, stimulating further financial investment and concentrated energy.
T.I.F., however, implies special attention and programs devoted to a particular zone,
to achieve the creation of the intended redevelopment and rejuvenation; where,
without major initiative and financial incentives, continual decay is probable. Its
success is also dependent upon its implementation in an area which has sufficient
promise, and sufficient potential, that through the boost of grants and-or subsidies,
it will achieve its intended rejuvenation. Such an area is the Faubourg St. Laurent.
Thus, the Municipal vision that links City planning directives and goals with the Tax
Increment Financing program and its incentives to achieve the desired densification,
once appropriately understood, implemented, and joyfully inhabited would make
Faubourg St. Laurent the prototypical and symbolic stepping stone for unification
and revitalization throughout Montreal.
Tax increment financing is not suitable for every city. It is not universally a good
development tool. Whether or not it can be beneficially applied in a particular city
depends on a number offactors-such as economic conditions, the number of local
taxing jurisdictions, and the local political climate. ( Gans, 1982 )
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Cities have always served as the magnet that bring people together to exchange
goods and services, culture, religion and social interaction. Without such central
places, people would be isolated from one and another and a central marketplace
and community would be non-existent. No one can deny the significance or
importance of a vibrant city that nurtures and encourages a variety of uses :
residential, commercial and industrial activities that work together, simultaneously,
intertwined; dynamically feeding off each other.
While cities evolve and go through different cycles of growth, boom and bust, as an
ongoing living organism, they must be treated when sick and applauded or
encouraged like a child when they blossom independently.
The type of sicknesses may vary, and along with that, treatments will also vary.
Montreal is one of those cities that may be described as presently undergoing the
sick period requiring special treatment.
This thesis takes an in depth-view of Montreal and its blighted areas, and proposes a
remedy that would not only encourage, but also make financially feasible the
redevelopment of certain key arterial districts that form a central part of the
ongoing life of Montreal. More specifically, the goal of this thesis is to propose a
vehicle, namely Tax Increment Financing, to stimulate physical and economic
development in specific areas of the city in a manner more effective and efficient
than the current system which has led to stagnation.
Through the implementation of Tax Increment Financing it is proposed that certain
blighted and decaying areas of Montreal could be revived if properly encouraged by
the City, with incentives for the private sector to initiate the development and
redevelopment of areas badly in need of special care and attention and to the new
resident who has thus been incited to relocate and thus participate in the
revitalization.
In sum, the sick patient is Montreal and the proposed remedy is T.I.F. . It can be
easily documented that Montreal has suffered. Montrealers have suffered along
with their City. From the euphoria of the World Fair (Expo '67) in 1967 and, the
most futurist subway and link, through the controversial but still world-class
Olympic games of 1976, (sixteen to twenty-five years ago) Montreal had developed
the reputation as a world class City known for its joie de vivre, and a happy, proud
and welcoming population; the Europe of North America. In welcoming people of
all nationalities and races to North America, it was conceptually and in self-image,
an international city. There was an unmistakable pride in coming from Montreal,
and an excitement and anticipation in visiting Montreal.
The City had always had its problems, but its two nations, two solitudes of English
and French were thought of and identified as one of cultural diversity - an asset, a
unique element, unfound elsewhere and thus an example of coexistence and
harmony that made Montrealers unique, proud and generous hosts to the world.
This harmony was felt everywhere and was symbolically represented and
experienced at the Montreal Forum where for decades Montreal's illustrious hockey
playing Canadians with their Flying Frenchmen identity carried with them the spirit,
the message, and the identity of Montreal throughout North America and onward to
Europe. That spirit was felt possibly most intensely at the Forum where there was
no question of which language and culture, but also throughout the streets of the
City.
If the sporting example can be carried further, it is through the vibrancy of the '60s
that Montreal was granted a baseball franchise; which since the late '80s, if not for
some miraculous intervention, it is in danger of losing, along with the spirit that has
been gone in the past years.
To those readers who are not familiar with the unique structure of Canada, the
country and its provinces developed from its founding English and French
nationalities. Life under this dual regime has been less then perfect. French
Quebec, formerly inward looking with a very religious and cultural orientation, fed
up with English business dominance in Montreal, the vast majority that is the
French-Canadian population has only now managed to reverse what they had
considered to be, and had probably personally experienced as secondary ranking
within their home province of Quebec. The social cost of this transformation has
been two-fold.
On the one hand, the exodus of a substantial portion of Montreal's original
Anglophone and immigrant Allophone population; and a tension and uncertainty
about the political and economic future of the province, the country and the City of
Montreal. It must be noted that traditionally Montreal has, and still houses,
proportionally the largest English population of the Province of Quebec, making up
over a third of Montreal's population.
On the other hand, the consequences of this social transformation saw and ensured
that Montreal became a more meritocratic society whereby one was employed or
advanced based on their individual achievements rather than, for example, with
which Anglo family they may have been associated . In spite of repressive language
legislature, bilingualism from either direction is the essential ingredient, and the
long term formula for international participation and success.
Through this period of social transformation, Montreal's municipal government also
passed through a very substantial change. Dominated by the Civic Party of Mayor
Jean Drapeau, who reigned for a period of 32 years through the international glory
years of Montreal, the weaknesses in his autocratic rule and principally international
vision became glaring. By the time in 1972 that Mayor Drapeau unveiled the
grandiose designs for the Olympic Park to the international media, local social
groups and their representatives, attempting to stimulate much needed change, were
inviting those same world representatives to view Montreal's neglected
neighbourhoods. Through the continuing power and dominance of the Drapeau
administration, barely surviving the Olympic installations cost over-run fiasco
whose financial effects and burdens still affect the city today, the true needs of
Montrealers as a whole remained neglected.
During this period, there emerged many urban professionals, philosophers and
community advocates who refused to be dominated by the illusions and power of a
grandiose administration. Those same protesters who now form the backbone of the
grassroots neighbourhood awareness movement led to the emergence and
composition of the present City administration, the Rassemblement des Citoyens de
Montreal (Montreal Citizens Movement).
Elected in 1986, the new administration inherited a City Hall that had been
unresponsive to its constituents at their basic level of needs and lifestyles (for
example: housing, roads, parks, neighbourhoods, etc.). Moreover, Montreal still did
not have a master plan to direct its development goals or directions. The new
administration set out to rectify this need , and invoked the participation of urban
experts as well as the common citizen, in the evolution of a carefully researched
Montreal direction for the future.
Not intending to take sides in the political arena either at the provincial or
municipal levels, the events hereby described are simply to permit a broader
contextual understanding of the struggles by and for Montreal, and how that has
effected Montrealers.
In this context beneficial development has been stifled with the exception of
response to some government grant, financing initiatives.
A summary Table 1 of relevant dates and milestones at the end of this chapter, and
a detailed version in Appendix 1 gives an in depth view of Montreal's history tracing
its evolution from a fortified medieval city to its emergence as the proud centre of
Canada, to its subsequent transformation and re-organization as a smaller,
predominantly and virtually a unique Francophone society. This section outlines
the formulation and imminent implementation of the long-awaited master plan
which has been the achievement of the most recent period of Montreal's history;
also outlined are the various Montreal departments responsible for fulfillment or
attainment of the goals and directives described in this new master plan. Of special
significance is the selection and priority given to certain districts in Montreal which
form the focal point of this thesis.
In fact, Appendix 1 gives a detailed account of the history of certain important
arterial districts or arrondissements in Montreal from its founding through
maturation and their eventual downfall as the cycle of needs and uses has changed,
consequently neglecting certain districts that have become subject to decay, and
which are now slated for major redevelopment. Selected essential parts are being
prioritized, as they are fundamental to assuring the ongoing growth and vibrancy of
the central business district in proximity.
Most significant and most apparent has been the lack of growth in this City that was
once undisputedly, and still only recently, the number one in the country and
certainly one of the great cities of the world. Together with the lack of private
investment into the city, compounded by the exodus of a significant part of its
population, Montreal is vitally in need of a major injection of economic and social
adrenaline.
For the City to be rebuilt, the primary intervention has got to be the injection of
blood into its veins and arteries to revive the pained soul that it has lost. Once re-
energized, the spirit of the city and the people will rise and remedy the physical
erosion of this very special community.
This thesis with its advocacy of the T.I.F. program is part of the municipality wide
search for the catalyst.
Chapter 2 describes in some detail the origin and use of Tax Increment Financing
(T.I.F.) as a very viable and important vehicle that in the absence of higher
government funding has been implemented in cities throughout most of the United
States, where it has successfully managed to inject life back into many similarly
blighted areas that otherwise had little hope. This chapter describes the
methodology by which T.I.F. operates, as well as the use and implementation of
T.I.F. from a financial and legal point of view as applied throughout the United
States, focusing as examples on the mechanisms adopted in the States of
Minnesota, Wisconsin and California. The implementation of T.I.F. in the legal
context of Montreal is also considered in this chapter.
One can experience similarly blighted areas suitable to the implementation of T.I.F.
simply by walking through the streets adjacent to the central business district of
Montreal's downtown core; it becomes striking how the predominant landscape is
one of parking lots and abandoned buildings. In sharp contrast to the extreme
urban densities of mid-town Manhattan, the Swiss Cheese effect of smaller
downtown Montreal creates an environment that is no better. Much is required to
stimulate the in-fill of voids within such neglected areas, propagating their further
decay in a vicious downhill spiral.
In the central business district and throughout the surrounding larger area that the
City has defined as its central arrondissement or district, the master plan, published
recently after seven years of intense study and public participation, is master-
minding the cohesion of the physical and consequent social core of Montreal.
With a population that has been declining with the exception of brief stimulated
reversals, new construction in Montreal has had the effect of relocating people to
Montreal's periphery and adjacent suburbs, creating consequent vacancies within
the city. The ongoing flight to the suburbs which is a North American phenomenon,
is really unnecessary and arbitrary in Montreal; in contrast to all but a few North
American cities, Montreal and its core are incredibly livable, from its very centre
through to its different surrounding neighbourhoods evolved from former parishes.
In comparison to other North American cities, the one aspect that mitigates against
a return to the Centre is ironically one of the City's best qualities, the great ease and
facility of commuting into Montreal from its surrounding suburbs.
Conscious of the erosion of their city, years of analysis and study has now been
completed by Montreal planners, their consultants, citizens, and Administration.
The City is now on the verge of implementing its just published and promising
master plan.
It is a master plan based on the spirit and history of Montreal, identifying the
streets, places, parks, and neighbourhoods where Montreal's vibrancy has been
experienced, and where according to the vision and principles contained within the
master plan, it will once again be experienced. With the new master plan comes
optimism in the provision for construction at a density disproportionate to the
population trends in Montreal, as well as a re-creation of the densities of the urban
fabric which then defined the street and places that have lost their form; it is the
renaissance of a city through the rectification of its urban planning errors and
omissions of the past.
From where will the people come ? How will the key areas designated in the master
plan become built and occupied ? How will the aims, goals and initiatives of the
master plan be implemented ? From where will the funds needed for such initiative
and investment be found ? This thesis advocates allocations of motivational or
incentive grants through the T.I.F. process.
Since the late 1980's, with the declining population, the thorough but cumbersome
approval process for permitting of particular projects, and most importantly,
through the deeply felt economic recession, the urban developer in Montreal has
lost his motivation. From the last little splurge of construction which created an
evident and well-recognized over-supply of luxury residential condominiums and
office space for at least the next half decade and perhaps well beyond as per many
predictions; to the smaller scale residential builder, private enterprise development
has all but stopped in Montreal. They must be induced to return, and bring the
people to breathe life into the recreated, revitalized neighbourhoods through these
initiatives.
Chapter 3 describes the T.I.F. process of spurring on private investment to start the
redevelopment cycle and keep it going. This chapter gives a concise, step by step
outline for the setting up a Tax Increment Finance program in general, and briefly
compares U.S. legislative enactments of T.I.F. with Montreal's legal framework. In
sum this chapter sets the stage for putting into effect those programs to realize the
visions recently described in Montreal's master plan.
To achieve redevelopment following the guidelines at even the smallest scale of the
master plan, an economic development strategy is required. Such economic
development strategy must contain realizable policies, programs and initiatives to
ensure that the carefully- pondered and elegantly expressed goals might become
attainable.
T.I.F. with its redistribution of the accumulated extra tax funds created from added
values within the particular area, promises to be the key for such new incentive
vehicle.
Chapter 4 proposes this very economic strategy given Montreal's unique history and
the priorities as per the master plan, for rejuvenation of the decaying, blighted areas
of the central business district slated for redevelopment with the impetus through
the use of Tax Increment Financing . This chapter specifically looks at T.I.F. in
terms of its possible creation, particular detailed definition and actual
implementation in Montreal, and the actual choosing and collaboration with private
enterprise entities mandated with the task of redevelopment, supported by the T.I.F.
program herein proposed.
The City of Montreal has been aware since the '70s of the need to create a stimulus
and a motivator for the people to return to the City. The previous administration at
the end of the '70s developed a creative program called: Operation 10,000 Logements
(Housing Units) which later became Operation 20,000 Logements whereby it very
successfully returned a significant number of people to the City directly or indirectly
through creative housing built as a result of selling greatly below cost interest-free
land to the winning developer-client in a series of small, medium and large scale
architectural competitions. This program had the effect of dramatically increasing
the number of homeowners in a City with a disproportionately large tenant
population. The program was followed up, at a mini-scale but with slightly
improved competition criteria, under the Habiter Montreal (Live Montreal) program
of the City's present Administration; at a much slower pace because the earlier
Operation had used up much of the available land, and because the present
Administration has allocated most of the residual land back to its various
para-municipal corporations principally for the creation and operation of required
social housing for the poor, the old and the homeless.
Parallel to fulfilling an obligation towards the needy, the City seems to be
undertaking a mission of creating housing at all levels, in recycled buildings and
large tracts of land reclaimed from institutions and huge national corporations.
Certain of its circa half dozen para-municipal corporations have expanded into
major urban developers: If viewed as a consortium, these corporations now have a
virtual dominance on Montreal development. The financial rationale behind their
real estate activities stems from the promise and lure of an increased tax base
subsequent to the occurrence of development or redevelopment, and this underlying
and fundamental recognition of is of paramount importance. Thus, the value of
T.I.F. has been identified, if not clearly acknowledged. It remains now only to
decide whether it is best consecrated to the para-municipals. Designating such
funds to a broader spectrum of participants to involve their civic investment and
involvement is hereby considered greatly preferable. With reliance by the present
municipal structure upon the increased anticipated tax value, combined with the
zeal of their urban redevelopment mission, these para-municipal development
groups have become omnipotent in the market place; at the expense of broader
participation and larger benefit.
Buying land at prices private enterprise would not approach, and buying buildings
for redevelopment that property owners had neglected or from institutions whose
sale offering is initially to a public or para-municipal body, these para-municipal
corporations and their often bureaucratic direction and organization has skewed
the Montreal development market place. Although recognizing the importance of
their mission and recognizing also the value of the ideal upon which their existence
is based, this bureaucratic machine, however, in its present form, is limited in what it
can achieve for the City and its citizens.
If the City direction and funding were cohesively consecrated towards motivating
the creative energy, economic investment, and confidence of private enterprise in
following the guidelines of the master plan with sequenced priorities, it can then be
envisioned that the ideals and the expectations upon which that master plan was
based could be realized within our life time. The unification of private enterprise
and public leadership, and substantial vision is required so that development and
redevelopment can occur in designated model areas; the achievement of this unified
effort can then bring proto-typical success in a reasonably short period of time;
which, still in the '90s, could in turn serve as a catalyst for other areas of the city.
The benefits of ultimately increased tax bases should not be retained by the City
development machine but should be pooled into the private/public partnership
efforts to create appropriate stimuli for both groups, thereby creating activity and
social movement. The American example of such collaboration is Tax Increment
Financing (T.I.F.) and it has been available as a financing tool; as a source of local
capital and subsidy for the creation of urban development and redevelopment and
consequent economic development throughout American cities. With literally
thousands of examples throughout more than half the United States, T.I.F. is
proven; and ready for adoption into Montreal, Quebec and Canada.
It is through T.I.F. that this thesis proposes the actual realization and fulfillment of
the goals of the Montreal master plan. Focusing on a prioritized sector adjacent to
the actual central business district, known as the Faubourg St.Laurent, Chapter 5
through example of the mathematical model and the consequent Chapter 6: The
Conclusion attempt to demonstrate the feasibility and discuss the possible benefits
and advantages of redevelopment of such zone Appendix 2 through the
implementation of T.I..F. in Montreal.
TABLE 1: BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MONTREAL IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Time periods : year,
century or span Summary of events affecting development of Montreal
1642 Founding of Montreal -development of fortified city: Old Montreal (composed of narrow
streets -still preserved today)
Under French Regime: development beyond fortified walls: farmsteads forming first
until suburbs: east = Faubourg Quebec; north = Faubourg St.Laurent; west = Faubourg de
the end of the Recollets
18th century -all partitioned into rows ("rang": narrow deep lots forming street pattern today)
Population grew to : 8,000
Beginning 19th century British conquest, under British Regime
Industrial revolution; rapid growth
-fortified walls demolished
Population 90,000 Montreal becomes economic metropolis of Canada; residential centre for
1861 the affluent moves from Old Montreal to Golden Square Mile and business centre begins to
follow them
1900 Population: 260,000
to Annexation of many new towns to Montreal
1940's Population increases to 900,000
1940's to 60's First official regulations for zoning and construction: Adoption of Code 1900 in 1948
Election of Mayor Drapeau 1954
Trend begins: great autoroutes planned (major low rise housing demolished) streets
widened and development of suburbs followed by exodus to the suburbs
1960's to 1970's Great Development Period: recognized regionally and internationally:
Expo '67 ; Introduction of Ultra-Modern Subway System linking extremities of City;
Construction Boom; Place Ville Marie built (45 storeys in height);
Downtown District officially confirmed as new Business sector
C.U.M. formed to oversee development
Trend: tearing down of numerous buildings in favour of building modern high-rise
City profiting from increased revenues, encouraged development without community or
neighbourhood sensitivity
1976 Olympic Games
Land prices skyrocketed as high rise trend becomes highly desirable; real estate speculation
Prominent; older buildings and vacant lots neglected while owners wait to receive big $$$
Same empty lots remain major voids in today's urban fabric
1961-81 Steady decline of residents in Greater Montreal Area to the suburbs and out of the
Province
Nationalist, Partie Quebecois elected (1976) -Independent movement gaining momentum
Corporate Anglophone headquarters moved to and establishes in Toronto
Downtown under stress due to exodus & recession of early 80's
late 70s early 1980s To revitalize centre housing encouraged Montreal launches: 10,000 Housing Units and
20,000 Housing Units programs-competitions (further reinforced by Provincial housing
subsidies)
1985 Study begins: planning and development of Montreal -revitalization of core; decided that
public participation mandatory
Exodus to the suburbs stabilized (due to City initiatives) but downtown still suffering
1986 Zoning regulations still antiquated -1948 regulations still in effect
Para-municipal agencies: SIMPA, SHDM, SODIM, etc. (established in late 70's to 80's)
established to help implement housing construction programs in the city and protect
heritage property and buy land amalgamate underused vacant property
Development mostly initiated and carried through by para-municipal agencies without
participation from private sector
1987 New Administration set up team: Housing and Urban Development Department to prepare
master plan for downtown and adjacent areas
Division of sectors (18 arrondissement corresponding to historical, geographical and social
areas)
1992 Introduction of new set of zoning and construction by-laws with clear parameters re:
building height, density and footprint, occupancy and even exterior appearance to be
included in master plan
October 1992 Scheduled approval of master plan by City Administration council , until such time zoning
freezes on entire areas to ensure any new proposals will not contravene master plan
objectives
California's tax increment financing law was passed in 1952. To date, 146 cities and 6
countries have created TIF zones. Tax increment financing has become the principal
financing tool for redevelopment activity in recent years; in fact, of 244 redevelopment
projects underway in California in the late 1970s, 229 utilized TIF.
Characteristics of TIF zones in California are as follows:
* The size of the average zone is small. Of the 220 city and county TIF projects, 48
percent are less than 100 acres, 66 percent are less than 200 acres, and 81 percent are
less than 400 acres in size.
- More than half of all the TIF projects in California were initiated after 1972.
- Most of the projects are generating tax increments. This indicates that revenue will be
available to retire TIF bonds, and that local taxing jurisdictions will enjoy expanded tax
bases upon completion of the tax increment projects.
- Tax increment financing has not had a significant negative impact on the finances of
other taxing jurisdictions.
- Some cities have a policy of using only 50 percent of the total available tax increment,
while others have special sharing agreements with counties and school districts. Also,
bond indentures for some of the projects permit excess revenue to flow back to all taxing
agencies after required coverages are met.
Tax increment financing has been authorized in Michigan since 1976. In 1977, the City
of Detroit established a TIF zone that initially contained property with a taxable value
of $92,5 76,000. As of July, 1981, TIF has doubled the taxable value of property in the
zone, which is now worth $179, 252, 000. The project has generated $12 million in tax
increments since 1977.
In Minnesota, the Minneapolis city council created a nine-block, 23 acre downtown
TIF reinvestment zone, the Loring Park Development project. Plans for the project call
for clearance of virtually the entire zone, followed by construction of an estimated 3.2
million square feet of new office, hotel, retail and recreational facilities. The city issued
$20 million in TIF bonds. Before the project was initiated, the taxable value of property
in the zone was $18 million; annual tax revenues of about $900,000 were generated.
Upon completion of the project in 1983, the taxable value of property in the zone is
expected to be $150 million and generate annual tax revenues of $5 million(Woolens.
1982).
CHAPTER 2: FINANCING REDEVELOPMENT THROUGH T.I.F.
In the early 1970's, the U.S. federal government began phasing out funding for
urban renewal programs. In order to stimulate the redevelopment of blighted areas,
local governments required a replacement source of funding. Tax increment
financing (T.I.F.) was created as an innovative tool local governments could utilize
to raise their share of funds required for redevelopment. T.I.F. provides for the use
by municipalities of increased tax revenues generated by urban redevelopment (the
tax increment) to finance the public costs of that redevelopment, thereby enabling
redevelopment to pay for itself. T.I.F. represents a flexible source of funding for
redevelopment which avoids much of the bureaucratic delay which usually
accompany grant programs.
THE METHODOLOGY OF T.I.F.
A typical project utilizing T.I.F. proceeds along the following general guidelines.
First, the State creates an Enabling Act if none exists. Then, a municipality
prepares a detailed redevelopment plan and establishes a particular T.I.F. district. It
then finances its share of the redevelopment (including among other items the
acquisition and clearance of the land) through the issuance of bonds to be repaid
from future tax increments over the duration of the project. Such bonds can either
be guaranteed by the municipality or only by the anticipated tax increment of-and
the real estate within the T.I.F. zone. In the latter case, the floating of the bond
does not need vote or approval, not having an effect on the city's borrowing limit nor
its credit rating. Until the Tax Reform Act of 1986, such bonds were tax deductible,
and as such a lower interest rate was required. The increment for each year is
calculated as the difference between the amount of tax at the value of the improved
property that year and the assessment based on the "frozen base value" determined
at the outset of the project. Following the usually 20+ year repayment of the bonds
from the incremental tax revenue, the assessment at the full taxable value of the
project is reallocated to the appropriate taxing authorities to be dealt with as usual.
A more detailed examination of this process follows.
Once T.I.F. legislation has been enacted by the State, the community must begin
with the preparation of a redevelopment plan in which T.I.F. is used to repay the
public costs of land acquisition and clearance, as well as other costs incurred in
preparation for subsequent redevelopment through private developers. Citizen
participation through public hearings is required by most T.I.F. statutes, as is local
legislative approval of the redevelopment plan. Furthermore, there must be findings
of physical, social and economic conditions of blight in the subject area under most
State T.I.F. laws, and these conditions are unlikely to be alleviated by private
endeavors without public assistance.
Following approval of the renewal plan, the T.I.F. scheme can be implemented. The
assessed value of all properties within the project area is recorded and becomes the
frozen base level for T.I.F. purposes. For the duration of the project, other taxing
districts with jurisdiction over the subject property will receive revenues based only
on that frozen amount. Annual assessments based on the current value of the
property will be made, and taxpayers in the areas will continue to pay the full
amount based on the assessed value. However, revenues will be allocated as follows.
Revenues based on the frozen base level are distributed as before to the
appropriate taxing jurisdiction(s), while all or some portion of the incremental
revenues for each year of the project are allocated to a special fund of the
redevelopment authority which can be used directly to pay for improvements in the
subject area or indirectly to retire bonds issued by the redevelopment authority or
the municipality.
The rationale behind the use of T.I.F. for redevelopment is based on two related
assumptions. These are that property values in the subject area would remain
constant or decline without public intervention, and that consequently increases in
land values and assessments in the project area are caused by the economic activity
brought about by public intervention. It is on this basis that the use of incremental
revenues to finance the redevelopment can be justified.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF T.I.F.
Due to the fiscal inter-relatedness of many U.S. municipalities, communities, and
counties, there are some winners and losers. In the establishment and inclusion and
exclusion of T.I.F. zones. However, in view of the dominant public purpose served
the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.
Although the use of T.I.F. mushroomed through the 1970's and 1980's, the concept
has existed for many years. California was the first state to pass T.I.F. legislation in
1951. Other states, such as Oregon, followed California's lead, but T. I. F. remained
rarely used.
In 1974, the U.S. federal government's urban renewal program was replaced by the
Housing and Community Development Act, resulting in a decrease in federal
funding for local urban renewal projects. This need for an alternative source of
financing resulted in a surge in the popularity of T.I.F.. By 1981, 26 states had
enacted T.I.F. legislation. In 1979, 100 cities in California alone relied principally on
T.I.F. for redevelopment, and T.I.F. had been implemented in 91 projects spanning
46 municipalities in Minnesota by 1977.
Despite its relatively recent introduction, a report prepared for the California Debt
Advisory Commission in 1984 refers to T.I.F. as key part of thefinancing activities of
redevelopment agencies generally. That same report provides that The availability of
tax increment revenue is making the elimination of blight and community revitalization
possible.
In 1986 the Tax Reform act changed the non-taxable aspect of T.I.F. bonds, raising
the rate of interest to be paid in most cases where specific criteria that remained tax
free could not be established.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF T.I.F.
In the United States, municipalities are granted the power to use T.I.F. by numerous
state enabling statutes. A typical T.I.F. statute permits a municipality to designate a
particular area for redevelopment and to authorize a detailed plan for
redevelopment of the area. The municipality then issues bonds to finance public
works that will attract private investment in the project area. The increased tax
revenues created by this investment must then be deposited into a special fund
established to repay the obligations incurred by the municipality.
Although the basic framework is similar in states which permit the use of T.I.F.,
there exist variations in the manner in which T.I.F. is authorized and implemented.
Below is a comparison of the implementation of T.I.F. in three sample states:
Minnesota, Wisconsin and California.
MINNESOTA:
In Minnesota, T.I.F. is authorized by two different statutes: the Housing and
Redevelopment Act (HRA) and the Development District Act (DDA). Pursuant to
these statutes, tax increments are permitted to be used in order to finance
redevelopment, to assist industries and for purposes of general economic
development.
The Minnesota HRA authorizes the use of T.I.F. to finance urban renewal projects.
The financing technique to be utilized must be included in the redevelopment plan,
which must also include a needs statement, real estate data, plans for ameliorating
and marketing the project site and the costs of the project. (Davidson. 1984) In
order to address concerns of financial feasibility, local housing authorities are
empowered to require a performance bond from the ultimate developer of the
project guaranteeing that the redeveloped land will produce tax increments
sufficient to finance the project and retire the bonds. (Davidson. 1984)
The HRA also requires that the planning commission review the proposed plan
before it is presented to municipal council for approval. The council is to conduct
hearings in order to determine that there is a need for the project which is
consistent with other goals of the municipality. (Davidson. 1984)
Following approval of a redevelopment plan, the local authority or the municipality
issues T.I.F. bonds, pledging all or some part of the tax increments to be received
from the project to payment of principal and interest on the bonds. The HRA deems
such bonds to be exempt from constitutional or statutory debt limitations, and they
are exempted from calculations of public debt.
The approach adopted under the Minnesota HRA relies on the discretion of the
local redevelopment authority and municipal council for planning and for choice of
projects, and solely on the authority for establishing details concerning financing of
the project, once the project area is determined to constitute blight. (Davidson.
1984)
In Minnesota, the DDA offers an alternative means to encourage new development
in previously developed areas of a municipality through T.I.F.. Unlike the HRA,
the DDA provides guidelines concerning the geographic and financial scope of
projects, but does not require as a precondition a finding of blight.(Davidson. 1984)
A detailed plan is required for each proposed development district that is to include
the objectives for improvement as well as the effect expected for taxing authorities.
The plan must specify the public facilities to be constructed and must contain
estimates of project costs and sources of financing including estimated tax
increments, the amount of bonds to be issued and the term of the program, which is
limited to a maximum of thirty years for the retirement of bonds.
In order to issue general obligation bonds financed by tax increments, a municipality
must first comply with requirements in the DDA for public notice and hearings and
must also consult with other taxing districts which would be affected as well as
school districts and county boards.
Despite these requirements, the DDA does not limit the choice of projects open to a
municipality. A project meets the public purpose requirements set out in the DDA
as long as it is beneficial to the local and state economies.
WISCONSIN:
Wisconsin, unlike Minnesota, has provided in one statute the Tax Increment Law (
TIL ) a detailed process for the implementation of T.I.F. which includes T.I.F. as a
specific municipal power integrated with local planning and development
powers. (Davidson. 1984) Pursuant to the TIL, municipalities are empowered to
issue tax allocation bonds to finance approved redevelopment projects.
The process in Wisconsin begins with the recommendation of a proposed district by
the planning commission, following public hearings, to municipal council. The
council must then establish the project by resolution which must include a finding
that the district is at least 25 % blighted, that it is in need of rehabilitation or
conservation and that substantially all of the district will appreciate in value as a
result of the project. (Davidson. 1984) Also, no more than 5% of the total value of
property within the municipality can be committed to T.I.F. at the beginning of the
project.
Following the establishment of a district, a detailed plan is then prepared by the
planning commission and submitted to the municipal council for approval. This plan
must set out all proposed public works projects in the district, an itemization of the
costs and financing of the project. In order to be approved by the municipal council,
the plan must conform with any master plans for the municipality.
The TIL relies on the Wisconsin department of revenue to calculate the base values
by which the tax increments will be determined as well as the annual assessments,
thereby preventing local authorities from manipulating districts and properties to
enhance tax increment revenues.
The use of T.I.F. in a given project is limited by the TIL to a period of twenty years.
Expenditures must be incurred within a five year period from the formation of a
district. T.I.F. bonds must be repaid only from tax increments in the project area,
and are not included as part of municipal debt. In order to protect bondholders, the
municipality is empowered to create a lien for the benefit of bondholders on any
public works or improvements which can be attributed to T.I.F.. The municipality
may also act legislatively to enhance the financial attractiveness of the bonds. In the
absence of these measures, the bondholders security is limited to a lien against the
special fund allocated to the retirement of the bonds. (Davidson. 1984)
The approach taken in Wisconsin to the implementation of T.I.F. therefore involves
the interplay of local decision-making and the discretion of state revenue officials.
Municipalities can initiate redevelopment projects, but must follow statutory
requirements along each step of the way. Disclosure requirements concerning costs
and revenues, together with the involvement of the department of revenue in the
calculation of tax increments, limit future discretion for a given project.
CALIFORNIA:
In California, T.I.F. is authorized by the state Community Redevelopment Law
(CRL). Pursuant to the CRL, T.I.F. is limited to the context of redevelopment. The
process begins with a determination by the local legislative authority that a
proposed project area is blighted, implying that public assistance is required to
redevelop that area. The redevelopment plan submitted for approval to municipal
council by the redevelopment authority must specify the reasons for selecting the
project area, must contain details of proposed financing as well as plans for
relocation if required together with detailing the impact of the plan on the
neighborhood. (Davidson. 1984)
The CRL does not establish a maximum time limit for the use of T.I.F. for a given
project, nor does it provide explicit controls over the size and scope of T.I.F. for
redevelopment. (Davidson. 1984)
In interpreting the provisions of the CRL, California courts have enhanced its
attractiveness as a means of financing redevelopment. Local authorities are
permitted to adjust the base level for calculating increments when properties are
converted to public use or purposes. Also, redevelopment plans which are amended
are permitted to calculate increments for T.I.F. purposes based on the frozen base
value used in the original plan. These findings have confirmed the viability of local
practices aimed at creating larger increments which can be used to repay bonds
earlier. Other court decisions have increased scrutiny in the determination of blight
in order to limit the use of T.I.F. to those situations where redevelopment is truly in
the public interest.
Faced with increasing scrutiny over the initial stages of planning, California
communities must now maintain a reviewable record showing that their
determinations of blighted areas and choices of district boundaries are not designed
to enhance tax increment revenues. California courts do, however, regularly uphold
local flexibility in manipulating the base roll and the plan amendment process to
increase tax increments available for repayment of tax allocation bonds.
IMPLEMENTATION OF T.I.F. IN THE MONTREAL CONTEXT
In the province of Quebec, jurisdiction over taxation of property is given to
municipalities and is governed by the provisions of la loi sur lafiscalite municipale
(An Act Respecting Municipal Taxation). Given the vast powers conferred upon the
City of Montreal in its founding Charter together with the City's taxation powers,
the implementation of T.I.F. along the guidelines of the general model established
in the United States is already within the existing powers of the City of Montreal. A
detailed discussion of the exact mechanism and institutions by which T.I.F. can be
implemented in Montreal is contained in Chapter 3 and 4.
CONCLUSION
In its relatively short existence, T.I.F. has established itself as a viable means of
financing redevelopment of nearly universal application. It has become, for
example, the primary means of financing redevelopment in the state of California
for projects of all descriptions. In financing through T.I.F., bonds are issued to
finance the public cost of redevelopment, and are subsequently repaid using
increased tax revenues from the redeveloped properties. As illustrated by the
examples of Minnesota, Wisconsin and California, T.I.F. is simple to implement,
and follows a fairly standard formula with varying degrees of flexibility once
implemented. T.I.F. is readily adaptable for implementation in the Montreal area.
All indications are that T.I.F. would be as useful a tool for stimulating
redevelopment in Montreal as it has been all across the United States.
The "but-for" rule is the best one to apply in order to determine whether tax increment
financing is appropriate for a particular area. But for the use of tax increment
financing, will development occur in the area? But for TIF, will new business activity be
generated in the area; will unemployment decrease? If the city determines that
development will occur in an area anyway, without TIF, then increment financing
should not be utilized. But if the value of taxable property will not go up unless there is
some kind of economic stimulus, then the area is probably ripe for increment financing.
(Wolens, 1982 )
CHAPTER 3: TAX INCREMENT FINANCING
HOW SHOULD IT BE DONE ?
T.I.F. is in effect a publicly directed method of motivating private enterprise
development to achieve Municipal redevelopment goals and can be defined in the
following way: "A method of capturing the tax revenue that results from private
redevelopment projects; -a trust fund that collects those increased revenues and
allocates them...; -a spur to private investment to start the cycle and keep it going"
(Casella. 1983).
Cities that intend to use T.I.F. will need to make a very significant commitment to
the objectives, principals and process of the initially established T.I.F. program.
Dedicating budgets and efforts to the creation of a visionary but realistic plan
according to feasible schedules, credible market analysis, detailed contracts with
reputable developers, the sale of municipal bonds and a dedicated follow through.
It is only at the conclusion of the entire process that the desired results will be
evidenced, and possibly offerproof of its success.
American states permit Tax Increment Financing through enabling legislation,
establishing from the outset that state's ground rule for T.I.F. Most legislation
insists that the T.I.F. must be in a blighted area or in a redevelopment or enterprise
district thus serving to contribute to the public purpose for Tax Increment Financing.
The boundaries for the district must be professionally analyzed and determined, and
the designated zone must be reasonable and not arbitrary; established under the
condition that there is a market potential under the right circumstances in the
district.
According to Quebec laws, namely La loi sur lafiscalite municipal, -An Act
Respecting Municipal Taxation, chapter F-2. 1., and according to the Charter of the
City of Montreal, the City has specific powers adapted to its specific size and needs,
including the right to collect property taxes and administer the funds collected as
per their annual budget. Thus, no particular provincial or federal enabling act is
required for the creation of a Montreal T.I.F. . Moreover, all City tax moneys
presently collected go into the general funds of the City to be utilized as per the
budget in effect, that had previously been approved by the Executive Committee
and the Council. Thus, the particular designation of a Tax Increment Financing
zone, with future added tax values intentionally reserved in order to be re-invested
in that zone only, rests in fact only on a municipal Council administrative and
political decision, rather than on the enactment of law from a higher legislative
authority.
More importantly, unlike T.I.F. in the United States, such special designation does
not deprive any other tax collecting authority that would have relied upon tax
collection from building values that will have increased, as Montreal taxes are
divided into particular designations such as municipal tax, Olympic tax, surtax on
vacant land, provincial surtax on buildings, business tax, and water and service tax,
but only the so-called school tax is collected and distributed to a separate
independent authority.
Since there is no adjacent or related authority deprived by the incremental tax being
reinvested in the neighbourhood from which it was collected for its own
improvement, and now that by the present, Montreal shall be introduced to the
existence and U.S. experiences with T.I.F., its implementation following the
American example should be expedient if the political will exists, with the vision of
the benefit of such designated investment to stimulate a continuity of favourable
community redevelopment.
How shall T.I.F. be introduced, structured and administered ? The following steps
outline the procedure for most American States; with some variation, based upon
each legislation in effect that permits T.I.F. reinvestment within the zone, all the
while withholding and reinvesting therein, such incremental tax dollars that
otherwise would be redistributed to other authorities.
According to Casella (1983), in the Planning Advisory Service Memo of the
American Planning Association (APA, January 1983) the following are the eleven
(11) fundamental steps required in the setting up of the T.I.F. program. A
discussion and commentary on relevant questions and issues is presented in the
following chapter 4.
(1) Creation or appointment of a redevelopment agency; to what extent should the
city council or any of its departments be directly implicated ?
(2) An official finding of the need for redevelopment and delineation of the project
area. The existing conditions that require redevelopment and a market study to
establish that a reasonable potential exists to actually do so, must be well analyzed
and well documented.
The choice of zone within the city, in its order of priority, which should reflect a
master planning vision and direction for an added value given to the city beyond
that redevelopment only, in order to serve as a prototype for other important sites
of lesser priority.
(3) Start up and staffing of the redevelopment agency. To what extent should
existing staff, new staff, or mandated outside experts be retained as consultants ?
(4) The creation of the redevelopment trust fund that will receive all future tax
increments. Such a fund will be administered by the redevelopment agency.
(5) Adoption of an official redevelopment plan. An extremely detailed plan of the
specific T.I.F. area prepared by objective expert professionals under maximum
confidentiality to minimize speculation. Such plan should become law after
modification through the involvement of the expertise of the chosen developer(s),
the approval process, and community involvement (if any) should be grandfathered
by the redevelopment agency or authority.
(6) Establishment of a tax - base -year revenues. Any future increases above this
base will flow into the redevelopment trust fund.
(7) Solicitation of developers whether by negotiation, or by tender competition for
the selection, concluded by the formalization of detailed development agreements
obligating the developer and the city, within a certain time frame, to perform
mutually reinforcing improvements within the zone.
(8) Issuance of bonds by the redevelopment agency, secured by future proceeds of
the trust fund or by credit guarantee from the City, or some combination thereof.
(9) Implementation of all public improvements agreed to by the development
program.
(10) Retention of the increase in the assessed value of property within the zone due
to the various site improvements, also including the ripple effect of any increased
revenues resulting from general improvements or economic inflation.
(11) Trust fund revenues are used to retire the bonds. Once, after about 20 years,
all the outstanding debt is eliminated, the trust fund may be retired and the general
municipal fund becomes the sole beneficiary of the annual tax increment, as well as
the base year tax.
With the T.I.F. cycle of self-generated funds, which when reinvested spearhead
revitalization of stagnant or decaying areas, a process has been described that
appropriately and systematically implemented can be described as a tool for the
actual realization of city master planning redevelopment and urbanization
objectives.
Intelligently applied and responsibly administered, phenomenal sums of money
already taxed be accumulated and channeled, to restructure and redevelop the vital
and vulnerable parts of our cities.
The timing is right for Montreal, with the recent publication and present enactment
of its new master plan. Such master plan being full of the pure, optimism of
studious analysts and planners, the practical implementation of their goals is in
question. It can, however, be made possible by a program directly based on the
American T.I.F. model, for without (such) program the densities and re-population
required to revitalize the targeted neighbourhood shall simply not be present as
planned.
Consider this downtown area: 14 square blocks with extensive blight and vacant
structures, and encompassing $1.7 million in taxable valuations in 1956. Tax increment
bonds were sold, and public and private improvements were made. The area now
includes 400,000 square feet of quality retail space; 300,000 square feet of office space,
2,500 parking spaces, a 350-room hotel, two banks, and an open plaza- all of which are
on the tax rolls at $16,944,000. The site: the Capitol Mall tax increment project in
Sacramento, California ( Wolens, 1982 ).
CHAPTER 4: THE T.I.F. PROJECT IN MONTREAL; ITS CREATION,
COMMENTARY & DISCUSSION
THE T.I.F. EXPERT-CONSULTANT
In his article on the financial aspects of T.I.F. for the Texas Municipal League,
Dallas Attorney Ray Hutchison (1982) wrote about T.I.F. and its potential pitfalls as
follows:
One hazardous area lies in the temptation to economize by undertaking T. I. F. without
hiring competent help . Tax Increment Financing demands technical expertise . The
process is extremely complex; and the techniques of projecting expenditures and
revenues over a long period, conducting market analyses and other functions requires
skills not typically found in City Hall.
Local officials should carefully analyze their existing staff capabilities and determine
where assistance is required. Technical expertise should be brought in early to avoid
costly mistakes.
He went on to caution about other critical factors, namely, professional
determination of the boundaries of the zone; resolving the major issue of
maximizing the probability that development will actually take place as per the
value, and to the extent, relied upon in the project plan. Moreover, analysis of the
degree of risk associated with the zone, and its potential to generate sufficient tax
increments all rely on T.I.F. expertise, required to avoid the above and other pitfalls.
To learn from the myriad of examples; to conceive and collaborate on the
particularities that should be integrated in a Montreal T.I.F., including finalizing of
the zone and its limits; participating in the choice of, and negotiating with the
developer; and consulting on the development agreement, are some of the expert's
initial roles. Contributing to the creation of the Redevelopment Authority; the joint
determination of the program and the actual grants; and the proper and legal
creation of the bond issue for maximum benefit are also part of the T.I.F. expert's
responsibilities. To a large extent, the implementation of the concept and the
consequent demonstration (first) projects are dependent upon the quality of this
contribution.
THE T.I.F. ADMINISTRATION IN MONTREAL
As in the United States the T.I.F. project in the redevelopment zone is to be
administered by a redevelopment authority specifically created and
designated for that purpose. Such a Redevelopment Authority can be created
from a particular group of individuals selected from within city departments
for that purpose, complemented by people with special expertise engaged for
that purpose from outside of the city civil servant structure, to create a new
group without history that may be prejudicial to the operation in a creative
manner, of a novel private-public joint operation.
Such Redevelopment Authority or Agency must have the attributes of knowledge in
the full plethora of social, urban issues, finance and development; and thus be able
to interact on a priority basis not only with all City departments, but also serve as a
liaison between the private enterprise interests responsible for and involved with
development and redevelopment in the T.I.F. zone, the community, and the City
Administration.
Once chosen, their first task is to define the particular limits of the T.I.F. zone
within the limits of the targeted area, and to marry such project with interested and
pedigree local developers, who themselves should be involved early enough in the
process to participate in such decision.
The two go hand in hand, and without success in both of these complementary
selections, the success of the entire project is threatened.
THE EXACT LIMITS OF THE SITE AND ITS TAX BASE
The philosophical rationale behind T.I.F. is the withholding of future tax revenues
from the general public funds of the municipality, and its consecration specifically to
the benefit of a particular zone or neighbourhood for its betterment, from its
present status as an evident blighted area with a sinking outlook; and thus, with
incentive funds strategically allocated through concentrated investment and effort,
stimulating its rejuvenation.
The key concepts within the above are worth repeating: neighbourhood, reversal of
decay and the concentration of investment and effort. The successful
implementation of T.I.F. requires all three.
As such, the zone selected must be judiciously determined after detailed research
and analysis. Ideally, it should include all abandoned buildings and vacant lots, as
well as all under-performing buildings within its confines; especially all sub-standard
housing, especially if such housing should still be owner-occupied. The zone shall
invariably have continuous and contiguous components, and be determined of a size
small enough to be managed, but large enough that redevelopment shall have an
identifiable impact upon its character. Thus, the entire T.I.F. administration and
cooperative effort shall be implemented for the re-creation of a decaying
neighbourhood (and not simply a subsidy paid to those builders who undertake to
build on some urban vacant lot or lots) in the realistic expectation that the
construction of new buildings and renovation of many other will have a substantial
effect on the surroundings in the blighted zone.
Were the limits of the zone inappropriately determined and the existing buildings to
be renovated left out, I would think that the new buildings, if ever completed, would
just become part of the grey zone brought down to the level of the surroundings,
rather than elevate the entire neighbourhood to the new and socially functioning
one.
The temptations (to overcome) to concentrate on vacant land is strong, in view of
administrative facility; and more importantly, due to the strongest financial impact
of incremental tax funds of new construction on empty land. See chapter 5, where in
the Montreal Model, the vacant 20% of the zone creates 50% of the Tax Increment.
Accordingly, within a mixed T.I.F. zone, Redevelopment Authority must recognize
that a different mechanism of motivation or incentive is required for each building
type, building occupation, ownership status, economic viability, etc. Fundamentally,
in view of the interdependence of the anticipated new construction and the re-
vitalization of the existing buildings, a delicate balance must be achieved in the step
by step allocation of incentive funds tied to achievement and performance so that all
components can advance harmoniously and in parallel, a key ingredient.
Such fusion of promise, initiative and effort is required to assure the success of the
re-developing neighbourhood, and to re-assure those who have made a direct or
indirect investment. Since the largest investment fund for stimulation of re-
development would be achieved by the floating of a bond to be purchased by the
general public, and with the most direct, and politically least delicate security for
such bond being a guarantee from the T.I.F. Authority from within the T.I.F. zone,
the visible start and ongoing of redevelopment activity in the sector would be the
only clear method of earning investor confidence for bonds for the rest of the
project and zone.
American T.I.F.s vary not only in terms of the allocation of their designated and
accumulated benefits, but also in whether a bond is or is not created (otherwise,
only the annual incremental funds returned are available for use) and whether such
bond is created by municipal guarantee or simply by security from the T.I.F. and
T.I.F. Redevelopment Authority. Obviously the city guarantee would solicit a better
investor response, at a lower cost, but the city would enlarge its debt ratios at least
theoretically and thus risk lowering its international credit rating, thus increasing
the cost of money it borrows for all of its debt.
Therefore municipal guarantee of the T.I.F. bond is a contentions issue at the City
administration level and at the political level. Yet the use of general municipal
funds or funding indirectly and focusing subsidies (through the para-municipal) on a
particular sector from the general funds is a current policy and practice although
never clearly identified as it would be in a T.I.F. program. Its identification and re-
appropriation within the zone from where it was collected for its betterment would
have greater impact and would prove more economical.
In the total absence, however, of a municipal guarantee for the T.I.F. bonds with
little visible activity taking place, there is a high risk of failure in the consumer
response for such Redevelopment Authority bond issue if secured only by the assets
of the Redevelopment Authority and the redeveloped product upon which it and
thus the investors have authority and lien rights. At the start of T.I.F., certainly at
the first such bond offering, the City must stand behind the Redevelopment
Authority in guarantee of the public investment.
Once, however, the redevelopment pattern is initiated and established such that the
investor public is aware and confident that the area is in the act of undergoing
development, (certainly offer a successfully completed prototype) it becomes clear
that investment bonds secured by the assets and properties within the T.I.F.
administration and project can be publicly successful.
With the City bond guarantees, it is logical that the project has to be carried out at
least to the point its activities are publicly recognized (say 20-25 % started, possibly
therefore just exceeding approximately 10% of its economic value for the venture
fund) so that beyond this initial amount of municipally backed bonds, additional
bond issues can be successfully sold, at a somewhat higher rate of return, but backed
only by the assets created within the T.I.F. project. At that point, the City's financial
lines of credit are no longer utilized, and the endorsement is entirely a voluntary
one.
It is with the security of these dual floating of bonds that T.I.F. venture capital shall
be raised in two or more phases, with the T.I.F. asset guaranty allocated to the
second and subsequent bond issues, with the first installments from incremental
taxes earned to be assigned to honouring the initial municipally secured bond
offering, the security for which is not specifically tied to the project.
Another incentive formula often combined into American T.I.F. projects is tax
abatement. Unable by Quebec law to forgive tax on any non-religious property, the
City can, however, decide to reimburse taxes collected as a grant, for example on all
property renovated beyond a certain stage, as per the T.I.F. sector building analysis,
and as per possible agreements with the owners of buildings within the sector; each
agreement unique to the status and conditions of the individual building. Beyond
other subsidies, tax collected and reimbursed may be part of the motivation
required to renovate for some of the owners of buildings within the designated and
relatively blighted urban areas.
Obviously, the administration and control of such individual agreements with the
separate owners of the different buildings is cumbersome, but the ability to motivate
upgrading of the declining and under-utilized stock of existing properties within the
redevelopment zone is mandatory for the eventual overall success of any T.I.F.
operation.
CHOOSING AND WORKING WITH PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
Equally important as the exact definition of the boundaries and creation of the
T.I.F. site is the selection and intervention of the private enterprise developer.
Prior feelers having been sent out to selected members of the real estate community
and unofficial dialogue both at public forums and in private meeting for an
exchange of ideas having taken place, the fledgling Redevelopment Authority
would already have a significant idea of the interested parties who would be
qualified to participate with entrepreneurial creativity, banking credibility and
within the ground-rules established and with respect for two-way interaction with
the City Redevelopment Authority.
The Redevelopment Authority having already determined a leaning toward
commercial, industrial, or housing as in the case of Montreal's Faubourg St.Laurent,
it is through discussion, invitation, competitive selection, a possibly direct
negotiations with the (chosen) developer(s) that the City shall finalize the exact
definitions and parameters of its T.I.F. zone, strategy,program and funding.
Thus, the major private enterprise participant shall be selected prior to the final
establishment of all ground rules, such that his or their collaboration and
experience in the particular segment of the industry can become an essential tool in
the finalization of the program and its administration as a private-public
collaboration.
Should there be one or more private developers involved, and in charge ? The
answer to some extent is determined by public response. During the early and
unofficial interview process among qualified civic-minded developers, as viewed by
the experienced municipal members of the Redevelopment Authority, it shall
become clear who are those privately owned corporations that have confidence,
interest and vision in the particular project and zone for which T.I.F. shall be
invoked. In the event of more than one deeply interested and motivated developer,
token funding should be assigned to secure their proposals further elaborated that
demonstrate the private company's business plan for the project, based on a vision
and program for the area. In the event more than one such qualified and detailed
proposal is submitted to the Redevelopment Authority, these shall form the basis of
rigorous examination to ascertain their compatibility with City goals and directions;
and compatibility they should also be analyzed and reviewed for their possible
harmony so that the overall T.I.F. zone may possibly be divided under two deserving
project leaders; assuming the size of the project to be of such magnitude that it
should benefit from double initiative.
The Redevelopment Authority shall be satisfied to have one or two eager and
qualified collaborators, three or more would indicate that T.I.F. subsidies and
incentives are perhaps necessary, or required only at a minimum level.
Both in the selection process, and in subsequent decisions and actions of the
Redevelopment Authority and its collaborant private enterprise associate during
the redevelopment process, numerous positions and actions will be subject to public
criticism, as they will not be done according to slow public competitive tenders, as in
a City endeavor. This is the competitive strength and essential latitude for action of
a private-public collaboration. As such the Redevelopment Authority and its
direction must have the credibility, track record, courage and mandate to act
confidently and definitely in the interest of the project, in full support of the City
Administration.
Without eliminating any steps of the regular approval process, the private-public
T.I.F. collaboration project should be accelerated with the City's support wherever
possible. For the collaboration to survive, in the interest of overall goal and benefit,
the Redevelopment Authority, its decisions and its actions, cannot be the subject of
ongoing public debate and political football. In view of the sensitivity of private
investment, private/public collaborative effort, and the delicacy of the rejuvenation
and revitalization of a sinking and apparently stagnant or decaying neighbourhood,
once the decision is made to go, ahead full municipal support and latitude of action
is required, with only a general City Council overview of the operations and
progress.
Far from wanting to eradicate the democratic process, far from wanting to eliminate
the opportunity of a significant number of smaller private enterprises to bid on
selected redevelopment sites with or without design proposals, as per the present
advocacy of the T.I.F. zone, it is evident that such isolated projects as small
buildings on random vacant sites is less than ideal; and it would make the City
designated department the ultimate project master developer instead of the
preferred private or joint enterprise.
As such, it is hereby advocated that the entire site come under the principal interest
and operational control of one (or maximum two) suitable and credible private
interest, such that the City remain in the role of general verifier and overseer, rather
than project developer. It is only in the context of small property owners within the
site whose redevelopment (or more appropriately renovation) possibilities are more
delicate, that the City Redevelopment Authority should be directly responsible. For
the rest, a master developer should be mandated and motivated to redevelop the
site, negotiate with owners of existing buildings and land on behalf of the project,
with the private enterprise master developer having the preferred option of bringing
in developers of smaller capacity under their leadership for individual sites within
the zone, so as to develop specific product within the overall master plan, all
overseen by the Redevelopment Authority, all so that the redevelopment efforts and
investment be concentrated to make public proof of and to achieve the intended
goals of revitalization.
The creation of a vibrant new community, in the shortest time possible, from the
relatively hopeless urban blight is satisfying and appropriate reward for the
distribution and allocation of venture capital repaid by tax increment funds so
designated. A team of private enterprise companies acting in individual interests
but as a consortium, is ideal to maintaining the T.I.F. zone as the undisputed vibrant
hot spot of urban development, much the same as the concentrated efforts of a
group of smaller builders initiating and developing a new land subdivision.
As an example, in the early to mid '80s, there existed a large tract of land
immediately below the central business district of Montreal, that had been
reclaimed from the Canadian Railways. It was unfortunately bordered by Little
Burgundy, a '50s or '60s type of slum clearance-urban renewal-decaying social
housing area, and thus had little anticipated value for development. Acres of vacant
land were developed, however, within 3 to 5 years, motored by the 800-unit
condominiums and townhouses known as Floralies de la Montagne, and followed by
numerous 20,000 Logements, City initiated projects on adjacent reduced sites
favourably assigned to different small developers; creating through concurrent
development initiative, an unprecedented housing community. In the same way,
combined efforts and concentrated investment through responsive and appropriate
project leadership, can and should occur, in a designated T.I.F. zone.
THE T.I.F. PROGRAM AND FUND
In conjunction with the T.I.F. expert-consultant, the program is developed.
The exact limits of the T.I.F. zone are determined jointly by the selected
developer and the Redevelopment Authority and their agreement is
structured. The operation of the redevelopment of Faubourg St. Laurent is
approved by the Council of the City of Montreal, following the priorities of
the master plan and its directives, and the decision is taken to float two types
of bonds i.e. for example, a starter bond backed by the City guarantee for a
tenth of the bond values of the project, and one or more others subsequently
(once the project is publicly recognized as ongoing) supported only by the
assets of the T.I.F. Authority and priority collateral of properties within the
zone.
A decision is also taken by the City for tax reimbursements and other financial
incentives and initiatives to be consecrated to the redevelopment of privately held
under-utilized property in the zone through private agreements and two way
guarantees between their owners and the Redevelopment Authority.
Then what? A promising structure and an impressive pool of millions of dollars are
available and designated to the creation of a new and very special Montreal
neighbourhood. How can this money be approportioned fairly, to achieve maximum
effect and achieve the municipally directed and eagerly awaited results ?
Two essential ingredients exist to make the project generally attractive to a new
clientele, whether a clientele for commercial or residential utilization. In view of
Montreal's over-supplied commercial and office space sufficient for quite a number
of years, residential remains the catalyst to inspire the greatest neighbourhood
revitalization. As an offshoot, commercial service activity on a small scale is
expected to develop naturally. Thus, what will it take to make people move
adjacent, and almost into Montreal's present red light district, even with its walking
proximity to the actual central business district ? Moreover, what will it take to
motivate private enterprise to make substantial investments of equity and effort in
an area of dubious promise?
The answer: subsidies, grants and other financial motivators. The source of funds ?
Bonds floated by the Redevelopment Authority, sold on the public market at
appropriate rates of interest, the investment secured for the first segment by the
City, itself, and secured subsequently by the Redevelopment Authority and the
buildings under its domain; such bonds to be retired over a twenty (possibly 15 or
25) year period from the incremental taxes earned from the new project. But what
is specifically the mechanism or formula to make the public respond and accept
eagerly the purchase and rental of housing? Since rent control has effectively
eliminated all rental construction in housing, condominiums remain the sole
opportunity.
THE POTENTIAL MARKET OF THE T.I.F. SITE
It is a well known particularity that Montreal still has a disproportionate share of
residential tenants instead of owners, compared to the national or North American
averages. This characteristic, along with the disintegration of marriages and some
movement of youth from smaller cities in the province to Montreal, does suggest the
existence of a market for young single employees in the service industries and the
professions, for whom living in a affordable urban community would be largely
preferable to comparably priced accommodations necessitating the time and money
cost of commuting from more out lying areas within and outside of the boundaries
of Montreal.
The initial key is affordability. In the case of Faubourg St.Laurent, of equal
importance is safety; such safety can be achieved by the concentration of many new
people moving into the area within a short period of time, emanating only from a
municipal (and correlated private) commitment to the creation of a new
environment and neighbourhood.
The Hurtubise Report by economist, Gilles Hurtubise, reaffirmed to the City"s
SHDU, presently responsible for the Faubourg St. Laurent through an earlier focus
group(s) interaction and feedback, that people would accept the area as long as a
substantial number of people moved in almost concurrently. The success of the
project, to an overwhelming extent, depends on the rate of absorption.
THE T.I.F. SUBSIDIES
Experience in housing in Montreal for the last 15 years has shown that various
Federal, Provincial, and Municipal programs of subsidies to boost the housing and
construction industry were so well received by the public as to create major activity
in the residential construction industry in three to five year alternating cycles of
boom and bust.
Municipal subsidies of $5,000 per new home owner, in the early 1980's, sometimes
overlapping with $3,000 Provincial grants (Corvee Habitation), subsequent programs
for the purchase of housing for couples with children, first time buyers, Mon Taux
Mon Toit, rebates of taxes for the first 5 years, and permission to use registered (but
frozen) tax free saving funds for housing (RHOSP) in the early 1980'S, and (RRSP)
in the early 1990's have all influenced whatever natural market which may have
existed, and have all had substantial roles in the creation of housing cycles in
Montreal.
From past experience, the cash gift of $5,000 to each new homeowner (or
condominium purchaser) applied to purchasers downpayment seems to be sufficient
motivator, especially in an era of low interest rates. A maximum of $7,500 per unit
can be considered for a pre-determined number of pioneers for new housing within
such initially risque sector, as the Faubourg St. Laurent, with such amounts over and
beyond any other current government program or grant that may exist for other
locations, projects and properties. Such funding would obviously emanate from the
tax increment bonds, and their motivating effect would ultimately create the
program's success.
THE PRIVATE-PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT
Is this enough for private enterprise to embark ? If yes, under what conditions or
under what incentives and at what risk would professional developers build
specifically in the Faubourg St. Laurent, to satisfy the City's master plan directives ?
Principally, the clients would purchase only if the product was affordable -
affordability in the present context hovering below $100,000 and under no
circumstances exceeding $125,000 for reasonably sized and well designed possibly
two bedroom units (one master bedroom and one study). One bedroom must be
less (75-85,000$) for the project to succeed with reasonable rate of absorption.
To enable construction of new housing in an incombustible structure according to
prescribed densities, the developer must acquire the land in the early phases for an
absolutely token or nominal amount. It is hereby suggested that the land per unit
shall average no more than $5000-$7000 per unit average. Moreover, the developer
should have access to the land with a downpayment of no more than 5% to 10%, and
the rest paid only at the sale of each unit, security to be subrogated in favour of the
construction mortgage lender. As such, the private initiative will join forces and
commit.
Beyond this below cost acquisition of land (subsidized by T.I.F. funds), the
developer must have the City's commitment to support redevelopment and
systematic upgrade of the entire area on the physical level, with improvements of
roads, sidewalks, parks etc. on the environmental level, with a concentrated effort to
eliminate the undesirable ongoing neighbourhood activities such as: peep shows,
pornographic movies, street walkers, etc.
Moreover, the Redevelopment Authority must also contractually structure such
deals with the building owners within the larger Faubourg St. Laurent area, that the
existing inventory of buildings are themselves significantly upgraded and often
reoccupied. The money for the City's subsidies to contractually create the
rehabilitation of these buildings comes from the T.I.F. funds. It is suggested that
these subsidies and agreements be administered by the City Redevelopment
Authority in the case of small buildings and their owners, say three stories or less
and less than eight units. Larger than that, the agreements and the improvements
should involve the private enterprise responsible for the overall project, allocating
T.I.F. funds suitable for fair and mutually beneficial two way commitments,
overseen by the public Redevelopment Authority
The Development Agreement to structure the joint and individual responsibilities of
both participants in the private-public association is an important, if delicate
document. It must commit both parties in a step-by-step guaranty of execution of
their respective mandates and responsibilities, all the while permitting such
flexibility as the market, and such innovative program, demands. Care must be
taken, however, that all subsidies and grants are disbursed to the private enterprise
based on their performance, so that at no point in time are public funds at risk,
given to a non-performing private associate. Reciprocal guaranties and reasonable
flexibility must characterize such important contract.
As we discuss the relationship between the developer and tax increment financing, we
have to keep in mind the fact that the basic purpose of the state TIF law is to provide
cities with tools to induce redevelopment in partnership with the private sector. also, if
there is no private development in a reinvestment zone, there won't be any tax
increment.
Cities probably are going to find that developers of all sizes are going where they receive
incentives, and where they are getting help. So if you are going to get development, even
in the largest cities, you must provide incentives. ( Hayes. 1982)
CHAPTER 5: THE MONTREAL T.I.F. CASE STUDY; FAUBOURG ST-
LAURENT
For planning purposes, the city of Montreal's new Master Plan has divided the city
into nine districts or arrondissements based on historical, physical/geographical and
social characteristics. The first and most prominent district to have been extensively
studied is the Ville-Marie Arrondissement; it includes the city's oldest quarters up
to Mount Royal, which is the identity of Montreal, and also incorporates the present
downtown business sector of Montreal. Within this arrondissement, several smaller
sectors of importance have been defined, some for which detailed planning and
redevelopment is intended. The following prototype analyzes a site within one
priority-designated sector of the above.
The Faubourg St-Laurent is one of the oldest neighbourhoods in Montreal, having
been one of the first settlements established beyond the original walls of the Ville-
Marie colony during the 18th century. Due to its cultural significance and historical
importance, its proximity to the actual business center and as a result its potential as
a generator for revitalization, the area has been designated for particular priority by
the City; it visibility and media exposure potential make it an excellent choice as a
prototype project.
The Faubourg's shape is that of an "L". Its lower leg facing City Hall and its raised
landscaped Plaza, is defined to the south by the Ville-Marie Autoroute, up to Rene-
Levesque Boulevard between St-Laurent Boulevard to the west and Wolfe Street to
the east. North of Rene-Levesque Boulevard the Faubourg narrows between St-
Laurent Boulevard and Sanguinet Street, extending northward to Sherbrooke Street.
Within this area, three important subzones requiring particular attention and
investment have been identified: these are a smaller existing residential zone of
historical character concentrated principally along Ste- Elizabeth Street, the
commercial district along Ste-Catherine Street East and finally the Boulevard St-
Laurent zone which is also an important commercial artery, besides being the
historical and psychological delineator between Montreal's east and west sectors,
and their respective predominantly French and English population.
Several parcels of empty land within the Faubourg have already been bought by one
of the City's para-municipal organizations, the SHDU, with the intention of
initiating a redevelopment project, largely based on the construction of new housing
and, as a focus for the area, the creation of a public park on a site which was a
public market in the 19th century. The area which has been outlined as the potential
T.I.F. zone for the purposes of this study, bases itself on these nine or so sites; these
form the nucleus of the proposed T.I.F. zone which radiates outwards from them to
also include a few neighbouring streets and empty lots in need of stimulation. The
zone proposed for the application of the T.I.F. strategy was enlarged beyond the
core of the city-owned sites because it was felt that these sites did not necessarily
form a large enough environmental basin nor important enough social basis for the
revitalization of a community even with T.I.F. inspired initiative and investment.
Furthermore, in an attempt to directly stimulate the revitalization of a larger
depressed area, the assumption was that for this prototype site, a more important
impact/effect was required in order to make this a successful and noteworthy
example of conscientious revitalization, as future endeavors of the same nature are
envisioned for other areas of Montreal.
The proposed T.I.F. zone covers roughly 32 acres, the original City-owned sites
making up a little less than one fifth of this zone within the larger City's Faubourg
St. Laurent sector; the T.I.F. zone's southern edge is defined by Rene- Levesque
Boulevard, its western limit by St-Laurent Boulevard and by Ste-Elizabeth Street to
the east. To the north, the zone extends past Ste-Catherine Street up to Boisbriand
Street where Habitations Jeanne-Mance is located, a low-density high-rise housing
project built in the early '60s in attempt to furnish social housing for poorer families
within the central core. The general area is presently rundown and it harbours
Montreal's red light district, with its accompanying undesired attributes, activities
and related social consequences. Although vacant lots abound in the zone (many of
which have been used as parking lots "temporarily" for numerous years if not
decades), an important existing housing stock is apparent. Encouraged mostly by a
few municipal projects, some selected but very minor renovation projects of
buildings have occurred in recent years; most, however, being of a residential nature
through condominium conversions, private coops and social housing; the effects are
apparent and suggestive, but the trend still remains fairly timid, especially for the
commercial component of the sector. The most significant encouragement for the
area is the current renovation of the Monument National which was built in 1912
and which houses a theatre school, prop workshops and several performance halls.
Situated on St-Laurent Boulevard, and with the projected City park in front of it,
this building, due to its cultural and social importance, will definitely play a primary
role in the restructuring of the neighbourhood.
CURRENT PROPERTY VALUES AND TAX REVENUE
In order to obtain the zone's designated T.I.F. existing tax base, the present property
evaluations had to be tabulated. The Greater Montreal Urban Community of which
the City of Montreal is a member, determines the property evaluations for the
entire island of Montreal, from which values each municipality then calculates and
imposes its taxes. The evaluations for 1992 were obtained through the City of
Montreal's public information system on property evaluations and taxes. Each of
the lots and buildings in the zone were researched and categorized according to
three main uses, which in turn determine the various tax rates applicable to them; it
must be noted here that the properties were categorized according to the zoning
outlined in the soon-to-be adopted Master Plan and Cadre Reglementaire.
Commercially-zoned properties totalled $64,979,800 in value, of which $3,593,800,
less than 5 %, represents vacant lots. Properties zoned as semi-commercial, that is
where commercial occupancy is allowed in the same building as residential,
amounted to $2,796,700 with $1, 1 14,800,or an alarming 40%, of this being vacant
lots. The present value of residentially-zoned properties is $10,571,200, of which
almost 33%, $3,454,000, is made up of vacant lots. The total property evaluation
within the T.I.F. zone therefore amounts to $81,941,500, the overall proportion of
vacant lots being approximately 10% and thus representing a value of $8,162,600.
The municipal taxes levied by the City of Montreal on all properties are at different
rates according to the type of occupancy, are the following; and range from 1.88$
per one hundred dollar evaluation for residential; 2.46$ per one hundred dollar
evaluation for semi-commercial and 2.50$ per one hundred dollar evaluation for
commercial building owners, with an additional, high, business and water tax for
commercial tenants on rented buildings.
-Property Tax
-Surtax on Vacant Lots
-Olympic Tax, which helps finance the debt incurred in the hosting of the
1976 summer Olympic games.
-Provincial Surtax on Non-Residential Buildings, which, following a recent
tax restructuring, the provincial government has allowed municipalities to
levy as a means of financing public transportation.
-Business Tax, which is imposed to the owner of all businesses, and not
applicable for vacant space.
-Water Tax, which is imposed solely on the tenants of non-residentially
zoned properties, and is thus not applicable in the case of vacancy.
-School Tax, which is applied to all properties and which is the only one of
the above taxes which is not collected and retained by the City.
Note: Not included is the transfer fee imposed on all real- estate
transactions, the mutation tax.
As indicated in the accompanying charts, the total amount which can be collected in
taxes for this T.I.F. zone has been calculated to be $2,160,520 on an annual basis.
This amount forms the base frozen for comparison and calculation of the
anticipated tax increase obtainable from the T.I.F. zone.
ANTICIPATED INCREASED PROPERTY VALUES: ASSUMPTIONS AND TAX REVENUE
Regarding existing buildings, it has been conservatively assumed, for simplicity of
calculation that, properties once renovated would increase very conservatively by
an average value of 25 % from their present evaluations; i.e. an average of every
second property increasing in value by 50 % from some investment and renovation,
or every third property increasing in value by 75 % -the above assumption is very
low in the event of revitalization of the area, as within such momentum greater
activity should occur especially with City grants proposed, for half payment of
renovation funds. This being the case, the existing constructed properties would
increase in value from $73,778,900 to $92,223,500.
Regarding vacant land, in response to the Master Plan and Cadre Reglementaire
which were recently revealed in their final forms and which will soon come into
effect for the district, the potential of each lot was calculated according to these new
zoning bylaws and regulations.
Since in-depth studies had previously been undertaken by the SHDU to decide on
the best utilization of the nine sites already owned by the City, the directions and
physical solutions proposed in their most recent report, and thus presented as the
City's desires for redevelopment of the sites, were utilized as the starting point for
the calculation of the potential property values of these presently vacant lots
redeveloped. Firstly, the value of the commercially-zoned land which is to be
converted to public park was subtracted from the total of the evaluations to be
tabulated, the reason being that as public property it would no longer be taxable.
Next, obtained from the SHDU's report, the maximum building imprint, the recom-
mended building heights, as well as the maximum building area accordingly allowed
were obtained from the SHDU's report. Also given were the occupancies which
would be accommodated in the various buildings to be constructed; the value of the
new buildings could then be easily estimated. Knowing the allowable areas of the
proposed buildings, their value was estimated at $175/square foot for commercial
and office space and at $125/square foot for all residential space, as per the
experiences of the Montreal market for comparables. As a precaution not to
exaggerate the calculations of the increased value, it was assumed that the land
value of these lots was to remain unchanged from their present evaluations.
Vacant lots within the T.I.F. zone that were not included in the SHDU's report were
analyzed according to the proposed guidelines for occupancy, building height and
floor area ratio which would soon be applicable. Based on these criteria, and,
particularly in the case of residential buildings, on the physical results of the
SHDU's studies for its own sites, the areas of the buildings to be constructed were
calculated and their values estimated in the same manner as that used for the
SHDU sites.
The value represented by the new construction in the T.I.F. zone was estimated at
$114,124,900. Thus, the potential total value of the properties within the zone was
evaluated at $206,348,400. Broken down, this translates into $122,456,500 in
commercial property, $31,891,400 in semi-commercial property and $52,000,500 in
residential property.
As described fully in the accompanying charts, the total amount which could be
collected in taxes for this T.I.F. zone once the regeneration is completed has been
calculated to be $4,894,220 on a yearly basis. Since the tax revenue on these
properties, as calculated, presently amounts to $2,160,520 annually, using the T.I.F.
system, the potential increase in tax revenue for the zone is roughly $2,733,700
million per year. With tenant's business and water tax added however, the above is
to be increased by over $600,000 to $3,357,945, at the assumed 75% occupancy for
all commercial space.
SHDU SITES VS. THE ENLARGED PROPOSED T.I.F. ZONE
As mentioned previously, covering an area of approximately 6 acres, the original
nine sites already owned by the City and which the city intends to use as the catalyst
for the physical and economic revitalization of the whole Faubourg currently
represents a property value of $5,046,600 that generates a theoretical property tax
(excluding tenant's business and water) revenue of $226,760 on an annual basis.
Following the revitalization anticipated and directed by the SHDU's studies, the
total potential property value attains $71,316,400 which annually produces
$1,603,005 in tax revenues (excluding tenants business and water tax); an increase
of $1,376,245, to be increased further by business and water tax if commercial space
is occupied.
Comparison of the incremental T.I.F. value from the smaller (SHDU) and larger
zone reveals the powerful tax incremental effect of vacant land. As such the SHDU
sites which comprise just less then 20% of the overall zone produces approximately
50% of the incremental tax earned.
BOND VALUE OF THE INCREMENTAL TAX
The approximately two and three quarter million dollars of tax incremental value
annually created should be reviewed in several contexts. Firstly, for such value to
be obtained, the project must succeed with new construction and renovation to the
performance anticipated and assumed for the calculations. The results tabulated
being conservative, if the initial hurdle to create the momentum can be overcome, a
great potential exists beyond the dollars mentioned. Secondly, tenant taxes for
commercial and office occupations add an extra pool of potential municipal tax
revenues as a result of T.I.F. and its incremental taxes created and collected.
The most obvious caution however, must be in securing that the project does
maintain a consistent and substantial momentum to assure its success; and that even
with such continuity, the initial years do not promise a tax increment value
comparable to the amount calculated. In fact, during the first year or two with
demolition, evaluation and taxes shall temporarily be reduced. A three to five year
cycle from first construction to sufficient completion to create the aforementioned
tax incremental values should be budgeted. Beyond those years, it is expected that
these values shall be exceeded; additional unbudgeted revenues can be used either
for other municipal benefits; or for retiring at an earlier stage, the financing initially
obtained. As such, and in simplistic, round number terms, a twenty year repayment,
private investor bond can be floated; its value calculated at the current yield rate
approximating corporate bonds (even though secured by real property), according to
the following cash flows incremental from the tax base prior: Namely,
conservatively at the end of year one, half a million dollars; year two, a million
dollar; year three, a million and a half; year four, two million; year five, two and
half million; year six and beyond more than two and half million.
The present dollar value of such bond, varying with, and benefiting from
today's low interest rates, is in the order of magnitude exceeding thirty
million dollars. As outlined below, the capital cost of creating such
municipal value is less than twenty million.
CITY EXPENSES FOR THE CREATION OF SUCH T.I.F. ZONE
Detailed in the subsequent illustration, and elaborated upon in Chapter 4, such
money is to be used for direct improvements into the zone creating its
redevelopment momentum through private effort and enterprise. Public investment
for the acquisition of land (to be resold at a lower price) improvements of street and
services, urban design and the creation of parks, funding for grants and subsidies to
motivate the repopulation of the area as per anticipated allowances appropriate to
the objective, comprise this total. The results are certainly socially beneficial and
justifiable; the financing is available due to T.I.F.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
The present lowly state of Montreal and the author's yearning for the City to
recapture its former vibrancy, incorporating the highest principals of urban design
and planning, has undoubtedly been communicated through the earlier chapters.
That Montreal's stagnation and slow erosion persists is explainable in the context of
its history of the last couple of decades.
The present Administration has made a major investment of time and money to
study the City and its state, and conceptualize its revival through the repopulation
and consequent revitalization of its decayed central neighbourhoods.
In the absence of stress on the existing market rate housing, where buyers are few
and vacancies are plenty, the concrete realization of the envisioned City
redevelopment as planned is somewhat hard to imagine. For the goal to be
realized, for the areas to actually be revitalized as per the priority zones finally
targeted by the City master plan(ners) a miracle program is required. T.I.F. is
hereby proposed as that definitive catalyst.
The timing is ideal with the recent approval and present implementation of the long
awaited downtown master plan. Particularly with specific focus on its targeted
Faubourg St.Laurent area as worthy of, and appropriate for the initial concentrated
intervention towards meaningful community redevelopment in Montreal, there
remain the questions of how, and if, the optimistically dense repopulation and
consequent rejuvenation and re-characterization of such area can succeed ?
Although successful in the past to create migration into and relocation within the
City to upgrade (often owned) housing Montreal has achieved such an aim in a
diversity of areas, through special incentives, design-build competitions, and direct
and or indirect municipal, provincial, federal subsidies or grants.
In spite of programs geared to new construction on vacant lots of different sizes, at
no point has the City undertaken a concentrated effort to motivate redevelopment,
focused on one large urban area in need and participate in its redevelopment with
private enterprise in such a program, with a mixture of existing housing, and
commercial, and light industrial products in different states of mostly disrepair,
containing within it, substantial portions of (dispersed) vacant land. Repopulation
serving as the vehicle of rejuvenation, is hopefully to be achieved with free market
housing for the most part, supported by certain compatible service retail; -but unlike
other municipal redevelopment initiatives in other comparable areas, it shall not be
principally comprised of social and government subsidized project housing, even of
the best quality.
Respecting the quality and valuable humanistic principals upon which the master
plan is based, it is not immediately apparent -in fact it is quite difficult to envision
how the mid-rise (to some high rise) residential buildings anticipated for the vacant
Faubourg St.Laurent sites will be built to sell at market rates. To motivate
hundreds of people to overcome the negative image and insecurity as to safety
alongside the present red light district, an enormously creative and highly
motivating program will have to be developed and offered.
Moreover, since the successful integration of people to create such new community
will have to be achieved on a large scale within a concentrated period of time to
effectuate the changed quality of the neighbourhood, reinforced shortly afterwards
by the motivated ripple effect in the immediate surroundings to ensure that existing
buildings in the neighborhood become correspondingly rejuvenated and their
clientele improved. Without discussion at present of the effect on existing residents
to be relocated from the redevelopment hub itself to replacement housing along the
edges of such a zone or nearby, community support and local citizen participation
must contribute additional energy and momentum to a concentrated redevelopment
program and effort.
With the self-removal of higher governments in the United States from their role of
granting subsidies towards municipal redevelopment or urban renewal, by the year
1987 thirty two (32) States (Klemanski, 1987:28-30) had passed enabling acts in
legislature to allow their municipalities and cities to take the responsibilities in their
local hands. As a result, the number of cities in the States leading with their
applications of T.I.F. are 467 in California; 210 in Minnesota: 162 in Michigan; 130
in Wisconsin, to list only those exceeding 100 in 1987. (Klemanski, 1987) Such
staggering numbers can only represent the creation of T.I.F. zone upon T.I.F. zone
subsequent to recognized success of the achievement of previous examples.
In the United States with T.I.F. laws, tax collection rights of incremental funds
assigned by law to the city (beyond a certain base amount) are effectively at the
expense of some other related taxing body in the community; as under non-T.I.F.
circumstances, these authorities would be receiving some additional money if such
tax money became based on some tax incremental value, or even due to inflation.
Although, it is argued that without the T.I.F. initiative, no incremental tax value
(except maybe that due to pure inflation) would have been created. Still, there is
some controversy in American communities, from some authority due to lost tax
collection which had been redirected to the municipality for its T.I.F. zone, only
prior to repayment of the capital and interest of the bond.
In Montreal, no such loser exists. As long as school taxes, which form a very small
portion of the overall taxation amount, remain continually separate, the rest of all
taxes collected are placed in the City's general revenue fund, to be utilized as per
the latest budget's scheduled disbursements. Creation thus of a T.I.F. zone, T.I.F.
redevelopment plan and T.I.F. driven financial incentives become in fact, a simple
re-thinking and re-structuring of the use of taxes collected -a simple allocation or
creation of a localized neighbourhood fund through political and administrative
recognition that tax payments earned from a certain sector can most appropriately
be reinvested in that sector. All the more, when through the T.I.F. cycle of
investment, return and re-investment, the very creation of that incremental tax
depends on major municipal initiative and investment to motivate redevelopment of
areas that would otherwise not be attractive for natural market driven revitalization
or improvement.
To emphasize, T.I.F. in America was a radical new law, and a vital tool in spite of its
controversy in the taking of tax money from other groups. By contrast in Montreal,
there is no question of taking from any other tax collecting authority. The creation
of T.I.F. then in Montreal simply becomes a clearly identified administrative
program following a model successfully implemented in virtually thousands of
examples throughout the United States.
A program that is painless, therefore and beneficial; and a program that due to its
very appropriateness and simplicity can be implemented without controversy. Not
only is it advantageous, but it is essential. It is essential because through the
creation of a particularly designated T.I.F. zone, such T.I.F. program of funding
enables special subsidies to be applied only into that particular zone - subsidies
directly to the consumer and indirectly to the developer, in amounts so determined
that the T.I.F. area does attract (within the time delays envisioned) -the very
population required to fulfill the envisioned and prerequisite densities to make the
master plan redevelopment area come alive as intended.
In contrast, any general City-wide program of subsidy not specifically related to a
particularly designated (T.I.F.) zone would have the effect of dispersing the market
response to the program throughout the city without effectively re-structuring any
particular area in need T.I.F. programs and subsidies must therefore be in addition
to any other program if in effect.
Montreal City Administration is very aware of tax increments. In fact, the
operations and real estate activities of a series of para-municipal organizations and
their (recently acquired) property holdings are explained by future tax values.
These para-municipal organizations, totally confident in their aggressive acquisition
programs throughout the City in response to an urban planning vision and often
socially conscious mission, nonetheless have bid up the prices of properties, to the
point of virtually eliminating the private urban developer. This direction is clearly
short sighted, and the effects of the resulting and relative development vacuum are
already being felt. It is imperative that cities lead, inspire, structure, and organize
private enterprise initiative in development and construction. Only in those areas
where the City cannot find the way to obtain the desired results through private
activity, even through motivational programs and subsidies, only then and there
should the City undertake the actual role and responsibility of actual development.
It is hoped and envisioned that sooner or later the large land holdings and
abandoned buildings (such as for example Faubourg de Quebec and Faubourg des
Recollets which have had no real redevelopment activity) will eventually become
inhabited and or the buildings recycled as the case may be, through the invitation to
and City involvement with private enterprise.
The day is eagerly awaited when the rhythm of development is not dependent upon
the slow and awkward movement of the para-municipal machine. Its-or their
reliance on the value of future incremental tax benefits is self-justifying and
illusionary unless that incremental tax value can be created in fact through
successful development and redevelopment. Successful development, however, is
invariably the exclusive domain of the developers. Through their involvement under
City guidance, and through the benefits of tax increments being distributed to the
locally investing public, the cycle that is T.I.F. and the flow of subsidy funds that
works through T.I.F. can be financed, thus creating with this incentive, the very new
communities that the municipality has targeted, as per the very principles and
qualities that the City envisions.
APPENDIX 1: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF MONTREAL
Like every other city the world over, Montreal has been shaped by its history. Its
physical appearance today is the result not only of its particular geography but also
of the countless decisions which have been made by its administrators in response to
physical, financial and social factors since its very beginnings.
Arriving in 1642, the first Europeans, under the command of the Sieur de
Maisonneuve, erected on the shore of the St. Laurence River the settlement named
Ville-Marie, which was to one day become the metropolis of Montreal. Protected
first by a wooden palisade, as the population grew the settlement quickly adopted
the fortified city model of the 17th century. The city grew within the shelter of its
thick stone walls which encircled the entire area which is today known as Old
Montreal. Very little development occurred outside the walls as the area within
them was sufficient for the needs of the early settlers. Granted by the king of
France to the Order of the Sulpicians, the lands on which rose the settlement and a
good portion of the lands immediately surrounding it, was administered by this
religious order until the first quarter of the 19th century. Urban growth followed
the narrow street pattern common to many a European city; respected since then,
this contributes to the uniqueness of Old Montreal's character.
By the end of the 18th century development had spread beyond the walls of the city
whose livelihood was principally the result of the fur trade. Built along major land
routes, these farmsteads developed into the first suburbs; they became known as
the Faubourg Quebec towards the east, the Faubourg St. Laurent towards the north
and the Faubourg des Recollets towards the west. Under the watchful eye of the
Sulpicians, military land surveyors from the French Regime partitioned the
countryside into the rows or "rangs" of narrow but deep lots which strung were along
the major routes and rivers. These first layouts came to form the base of the street
pattern of today's city. Montreal was becoming an important center for trade and
the beginnings of a serious port were sprouting. By the end of the 18th century,
roughly 8000 citizens inhabited the settlement.
Following the British conquest at the beginning of the 19th century, Montreal fell
under the jurisdiction of the British Regime. With them, the British colonial
machine brought the advent of the industrial revolution and its strong commercial
ties with its Empire the world over; these proved to be the catalysts of Montreal's
rapid evolution. Financial investment abounded, things were changing quickly and
the first elected administrators of the city were brought into office in 1833. The
industrial revolution had brought about the development of light industrial
manufacturing in the city; immigrants from Europe as well as from rural Quebec
supplied much of the cheap labour for this development. The outlying suburbs were
built up with much new housing and several new factories; in response to the lack
of adequate transportation, the urban fabric was densified and well-integrated. The
English Regime planned the layout of numerous new streets. Generally placed
perpendicularly to the existing roads which had been outlined by the previous
regime, the city came to resemble its current grid layout with service lanes running
down the centre of the blocks which were thus created. The walls of the fortress
were demolished, and so tremendous was Montreal's development that construction
soon extended onto the upper plateau of the mountainside. By 1861 Montreal's
population had reached 90,000.
By the middle of the 19th century Montreal had become the economic metropolis of
Canada, and many of its residents were the individuals that influenced much of all
of the rest of the country's development. The city's financial quarter moved for a
time being to the outer limits of Old Montreal. As transportation methods
improved, residential quarters moved further from the Old City, the affluent
preferring the south flanks of Mount Royal which still dominates the area. With
them, the business establishments soon followed their clientele and set up shop on
the perimeter of the Golden Square Mile, as this sector of lavish mansions was
known. Immigration continued, and a strong flow of ready workers to supply the
new industries contributed to the construction of housing and retail services on
much of the available sites in the original faubourgs, in the newly-formed suburbs
such as Griffintown, and on the underused land between these areas of concentra-
tion. This practically unrestrained effervescence of construction contributed to
much of the present older commercial and residential buildings which today
compromise the urban fabric of the city and of the present inner-city housing stock,
whose mere number is among the highest of all North American cities. The advent
of the 20th century with its continued growth, and certainly with the improvement of
streets and the installation of tramways pushed the city's development to new limits
to the north, east and west. Several outlying towns and municipalities were annexed
to Montreal and by the year 1900 the population had grown to 260,000.
Urban development was still fairly unorganized as the financial prosperity continued
into the early 1920's. Construction along the perimeter of the Golden Square Mile
as well as within this area continued; increasingly, the business sector was
establishing itself here. The economic crisis of the 1930's considerably slowed down
development, many great fortunes were lost, and many of the prestigious residences
of the elite were auctioned off or given over to public institutions, setting the stage
for the area's eventual transformation into what is presently Montreal's business
center. The economic boom which followed World War II greatly boosted
Montreal's sagging economy but contributed little to the construction of new
housing. Instead, several new towns, small cities and municipalities were
amalgamated into the city's administrative structure, each with its own particu-
larities, characteristics, and regulations. These, in addition to the few regulations
already in use by the city administration, provided the only guidelines for urban
development within the city. With these annexations, Montreal's population had
grown to within 900,000 by 1941.
After 1945, Montreal's financial development accelerated. This had as much to do
with the advent of the baby boom as with the arrival of numerous European
immigrants hoping to start anew in a new country which had often been called the
land ofpromise. The beginnings of Montreal's slow demise as the financial capital of
Canada had however begun. Trade with Great Britain and its Commonwealth of
Nations was dwindling, and that with the United States was becoming increasingly
important. This particularly favoured cities in Ontario, and consequently several of
the large corporate entities began moving their head offices to Toronto. The '40s
saw the increased importance of the automobile and the advent of a new form of
residential development which was characterized by its low density. These single-
family detached homes, quite different from Montreal's traditional urban row
housing of duplexes and triplexes, were strongly encouraged through subsidies by
federal agencies like the Canadian Housing and Mortgage Corporation and soon
became quite common in the city's outlying areas and within underdeveloped sectors
closer to the city's center. Attempting to modernize and to expand, industries
moved further from their historical locations near the inner-city; the downtown's
prominence had definitely started to reduce.
North America as a whole profited from the technological advances of the '50s and
early '60s. This was true also in the Montreal area. Montreal's first official
regulations for zoning and construction began with the adoption of the Code 1900 in
November of 1948; prior to this no formal regulations governing any type of
development had been in place. Despite these new regulations, wrapped up in the
swift progress of technology and the dominance of the automobile, the City admini-
strators and planners inadvertently contributed to the disintegration of their
domain; in response to the increased use of automobiles, numerous streets and
avenues such Sherbrooke Street and Dorchester Boulevard (now called Rene-
Levesque Boulevard) were widened, and great autoroutes such as the Bonaventure,
the Ville-Marie, the Camelien-Houde and the Metropolitan Autoroutes were
planned out for the city and then constructed, often cutting up its established layout,
and forever reshaping the character of its urban fabric. Although the city center
retained its role as the business sector of the city and of the whole island of
Montreal, as automobile transportation became much easier residential develop-
ment spread even further to the outlying areas. The arrival of the modern suburbs
was upon us; the exodus of numerous families to the these new suburbs ensued.
The '60s and '70s represent a great period in the development of Montreal as a
metropolis, not only on a regional basis but also on an international basis. Under
the rule of a dominant administration with grandiose ideas, several events of
international calibre marked Montreal both in a social and a physical way. The
announcement and actual success of Expo '67 brought world-wide attention to the
city, and with it the construction of its ultra-modern subway system which rapidly
linked all extremities of the city. An almost unprecedented boom of construction
activity took place with barely a touch of opposition or control. Spurred by the
construction of the Place Ville-Marie, a modernist office tower of some 45 storeys in
height uptown from the former business core adjacent to Old Montreal, Montreal's
relocated downtown area was confirmed as the new business sector of the city and
of the Urban Community of Greater Montreal (C.U.M.), a regional body which was
formed in 1969 to oversee various aspects that affected equally the 29 different
municipalities established in the area, and which also includes the City of Montreal.
Modern architecture and its imposing approach took over the city. Many a building
was torn down to be replaced by tall towers or other buildings whose imprints, scale,
appearance and uses often greatly contrasted with their immediate low rise and low
profile surroundings. Delighted by the increased revenues this fury of construction
brought, the city administrators encouraged development, even funding major
public projects of the same sort. Enforcement of zoning and construction
regulations became increasingly flexible, and much to the detriment of the city's
fabric, the real estate developers virtually without community or neighbourhood
sensitivity .
This process and attitude continued into the '70s. The heralded subway system was
extended, and Montreal was marked by another major event, the 1976 Olympic
games. The dominance of the administrative and commercial functions in the
downtown core became increasingly evident as tower after tower was constructed.
Land prices skyrocketed in the central district and developers sought to maximize
their land by building higher and higher. Real estate speculation became prominent
and often older buildings were neglected or sometimes simply left vacant by their
owners, who awaited greater and easily-obtained profits as the value of their proper-
ties gradually increased. Numerous buildings were even demolished to create
profitable parking lots, and today, many of these open-air parking lots still abound
in Montreal's downtown area leaving the urban fabric even on many prime streets to
look like a former war zone.
Although some housing was built in the downtown area at this period, most of these
in large impersonal towers catered to the single individual whose revenues could
afford the higher rents. Most families fled to the suburbs where land and taxes were
cheaper; new housing construction continued to spread further from the downtown
area, feeding also the secondary construction sector of commerce, services and
educational needs that these new residential neighbourhoods required. The
downtown residential neighbourhoods were left to the poorer social classes, the
large majority of which remained tenants rather than homeowners. Statistics
Canada reveals that from 1961 to 1981 Montreal suffered a steady decline of
residents while the Greater Montreal Area which included the new suburbs showed
an increase in its population. The City's relative importance in the metropolitan
area dropped from 44% to 35% between 1971 and 1981.
Throughout North America, urban planners, sociologist, economists and city
administrators alike realized that the central cores of many of the large cities were
eroding and that the financial burdens of servicing suburbs while maintaining a
relatively under-inhabited city were becoming increasingly difficult to support.
Coupled with this, though unrelated except for timing, nationalistic fervor rose in
the province, and the threat of Quebec's separation from Canada seemed imminent;
many corporate headquarters and Anglophone financial interests moved westward
mostly to Toronto and beyond where economic and political stability were assured.
Montreal's economy suffered a strong blow which was only partially compensated by
a strengthening of the Francophone presence in the entrepreneurial and financial
arenas. Further pressure was felt by the recession of the early '80s which led to the
closure of numerous industries and again to the exodus of many companies from
Montreal. Something had to be done before the whole city crumbled; the City
Administration had to take hold of the reins.
The widely-held belief that the return of residential sectors to the downtown district
of the city could act as the catalyst for the revitalization of the area and of the city as
a whole was, and still is, considered to be the first step in resolving the problem.
Besides the construction of much-needed social housing which the City oversaw and
implemented through its municipal housing authority, the O.M.H. (Office
Municipale d'Habitation), and which it has actively continued to pursue, several
housing construction programs were launched by the city in an attempt to encourage
private-sector developers to participate. The 20,000 and 10,000 Housing Units
programs very active in the early '80s, as well as the recent Habiter (Live) Montreal
program, coupled with various temporary provincial, federal and municipal
subsidies, allowed Montreal to stabilize its resident population. City-owned
properties which were either vacant or underused, when suitable for housing, were
offered for sale to private developers through the use of design competitions. The
winners of these competitions obtained the right to buy the land at substantially-
reduced prices, with low down-payment and with interest- free periods of time to
help reduce the financial burden of the construction. Innovative project solutions to
increase Montreal's dwindling housing stock, and attention to the quality of life
inherent in by the proposals received, as well as the financial stability of the
developer were often the bases for the awarding of these competitions. Through the
competition process, the city could, to a certain extent, control the built
environment on its domain; although largely based on the criteria pre-established
by the municipal planners and administrators, these often creative design and
construction proposals most were approved for construction by the Administrative
Council through special requests in a process known as "plans d'ensemble". The
endeavor proved itself to be successful. According to the results of the 1986 census
figures, Montreal's population had then reached 1,015,420 and the exodus to the
suburbs seemed to have been stabilizing. But still in the mid 80s the downtown was
visibly suffering.
First elected in 1954, the Civic Party had practically ruled Montreal with an iron fist
until their electoral loss in 1986. Although it must be acknowledged that this
administration had done much to promote Montreal and to obtain international
recognition for this metropolis, it left a much-maligned zoning and construction
regulatory system, ill adapted to the changing requirements of the expanding
metropolis and whose track record was severely marked with dangerous precedents.
The Municipal Code 1900, adopted in 1954, was, and still presently is, the only
official regulation that governs all construction and zoning in the city of Montreal.
Filled with antiquated regulations, numerous exceptions and an incredible number
of contradictory articles, this series of bylaws have become ill- adapted to the rapid
evolution of the physical, financial and social factors of the city and that of the
multiple precincts and different neighbourhoods that make up its whole. As an
example, one needs only to point out that in the downtown sector alone, occupancy
and site utilization are presently governed by 22 bylaws, 9 of which directly concern
zoning and 13 of which govern particular matters such as streets, specific buildings,
etc.; and each of these can be, and often are, applied differently depending on which
city representative is consulted. The built environment is relatively poorly protected
in the present document, as distinct reference to the preservation or respect of
building character or surrounding urban context is neither mentioned nor assured.
Although a somewhat lengthier process, the great majority of larger projects have,
as of current practice rather than exception, come to be approved by the City's
administrative council through the "plan d'ensemble", the City effectively special
(with some input, involvement and improvement) the developers proposal.
This situation has, however, begun to change. In response to contemporary society's
changing views and its general desire to be able to better control the physical
environment in which its citizen live, work and play, the present administration,
elected in 1986, has brought a new democratization to the system. Public
consultation is now required at practically every step towards the ultimate approval
of most projects. Perhaps too meticulous especially as a new system, this has
significantly lengthened the approval process to such an extent that it has become a
detriment to private-sector investment especially in housing in the downtown area.
Substantial extra expenses involved in the presentation of the proposals and the
increased carrying costs of projects awaiting study, approval and commencement,
when coupled with the current difficult economic times, have resulted in very little
new construction activity in Montreal. Most of the dwindling number of large
projects which are presently under construction were projects which were approved
prior to the change in policy.
Para-municipal agencies such as the Societe Immobiliere du Patrimoine
Architectural (SIMPA), the Societe d'Habitation et de Developpement de Montreal
(SHDM) and the Societe de Developpement Industriel de Montreal (SODIM) and
SODEMONT which were established in the late '70s and throughout the '80s to help
facilitate the implementation of housing and construction programs in the city, and
protect this heritage. They have been on behalf of the city, buying and
amalgamating underused and vacant properties throughout Montreal. These
agencies began accumulating impressive amounts of real estate which have not yet
all become part of development initiatives. As these agencies began to grow in
importance and in entrepreneurialism, all the while bidding up the land and
property price they increasingly bought up land closer to the downtown business
sector where mixed-use projects tended to be favoured and required. Due in part to
the lack of private-sector enthusiasm, the role of these agencies has begun to change
and they have begun to play a much more active role in the construction of these
projects, most often developing the properties without any private-sector
involvement and often at substantial cost . Recent reports that these agencies
numbering eight in all, and which use public funds without (much) consultation with
nor control by the city's administrative committee, have caused many to wonder if it
is financially and administratively advisable, in a time of severe budgetary cutbacks,
for the City's development to be undertaken in this fashion.
With the excessively lengthy and relatively complex approval process presently used,
as well as the difficult current financial context, has the private sector forever lost
its traditional role in the development of Montreal?
A new solution to Montreal's dilemma seems to be on its way. After several years of
study, Montreal is about to adopt its first urban plan which outlines, in a sector by
sector manner, the goals desired for the City's overall evolution. Although several
studies on particular aspects of Montreal's urban environment and on specific sites
in need of revitalization had been conducted in the late '60s and throughout the '70s,
a new global and thorough study was begun in late 1985. This plan was discussed at
the Economic summit organized by the City in June of 1986 where, for the first time,
representatives from every sector of the community discussed the planning and
development of not only Montreal's downtown but of the entire city. The
participants agreed on the need for guidelines for this development, and particularly
in the case of the downtown core, the need to stimulate its revitalization by
diversifying the core's functions. It was also decided that public participation in the
elaboration of these new guidelines was mandatory. In 1987, the new municipal
administration set up a team in the Housing and Urban Development Department
and asked it to prepare a master plan for the downtown and its adjacent areas. The
city was divided into 18 different sectors or "arrondissements" which corresponded
to historical, geographical and social areas. Within these sectors, smaller districts of
particular concern were identified. The master plan established for the central
sector (which became known as the Arrondissement Ville-Marie) would then be
modified on a sector by sector basis, to reflect the particular concerns and
characteristics of each of the sectors. Complemented by a new set of zoning and
construction bylaws which spell out everything from building height, density and
footprint to occupancy and even exterior appearance, the new master plan for
Montreal's downtown sector has recently been made public. Scheduled to be
approved by the City's Administrative Council in October of 1992, these new
regulations will soon govern all development in the downtown area. Until then,
zoning freezes have been placed on the whole area to ensure that any proposals
which are currently up for approval will not seriously contravene the guidelines
agreed to and contained in the new master plan. Public consultation will become
mandatory in every project case; nonetheless, the normal building permit process
seems to have been made more efficient and clearer, and a step in the right
direction seems to have been made.
The City's planners and administrators have placed much hope in this new master
plan; but, will the private sector be motivated to develop to increased densities in
the urban core, with the clearer, more efficient approval process for most new
construction projects, so that the revitalization of the downtown core will be
properly initiated? Will the City be required remain or to become the major
developer/builder on its territory, or will further incentives be required and
available for private sector involvement.
APPENDIX 2: MONTREAL A STATISTICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC
OVERVIEW
HABITER MONTREAL
2.1 RELATIVE DECLINE IN THE POPULATION
Following a progressive decline over a 20-year period, Montr6al's
population-with 1,015,420 residents in 1986- appears to be stabilizing.
The City's relative importancein the metropolitan area dropped from 44%
to 35% between 1971 and 1981, but stayed at the same level in 1986
(illustration 1).
1 Population of the City of Montreal and
(CMA) 1961-1986
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Source: Statistics Canada
If the current trend continues, it is projected that Montreal's population
could decline again. A population decrease could lead to an under-
utilization of the existing infrastructure, a decrease in the demand for
housing, less residential construction, and a drop in municipal revenues.
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Population des arrondissements montr6alais et
de la region metropolitaine en 19861
Mentrial Ahuntsic/ Villermy/ ReOMomnt
Cartlerville Saint-Michell Petita-Patrle
Pam Extensin
Mercierl Plateao-
Hechelage- Mont-Royal I
Maisenneuve Centrn-Sud
Population totale 2921 357 1 014 945 122140 149335 133 295 137 670 125 750 50160 152235 67 900 76480
Nombre do minages* 1 115380 443560 51330 59960 62385 56940 60100 29810 70370 28005 24655
Nombre moyen do
personnes par m6nage 2,6 2,3 2,4 2.5 2.1 2,4 2,1 1,7 2.2 2.4 3.1
Proportion do logements
occup6s par les propri6taires 44,7% 25,5% 36.1% 25,6% 22,9% 27,4% 15,7% 10,5% 21,7% . 23,2% 61.2%
Superficie (ha) 350889 17550 2392 1593 1485 2222 1110 1209 2044 1347 4148
*Le nombre de minages correspond mu nombre de logements occup6s Source: Statistique Canada
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LOCATION OF THE CITY OF MONTREAL WITHIN THE GREATER METROPOLITAIN AREA
(City of Montreal, 1990)
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Located in the very heart of Montreal, the Central Business District is the driving force of the metropoli-
tan region. The cadre reglementaire of the Ville-Marie District will act as a model for all other districts.
It is in this perspective, of being eventually applied to all districts, that the principles and mechanisms
outlined in the cadre reglementaire have been drawn up.
(City of Montreal, 1992)
Plan 3 - Dislics of CENTRAL DISTRICTS
the CenmulAva 1 Central BusinessDistrict
2 Bishop-Crescent
3 Place des Arts
(City of Montreal, 1990) 4 Bonaventure
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THE FAUBOURG ST-LAURENT
(City of Montreal, 1990)
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APPENDIX 3: FAUBOURG ST. LAURENT - PLANS & PICTURES;
THE T.I.F. ZONE AND THE SHDU SITE
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APPENDIX 4: THE SHDU SITE; DETAILED CITY DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
ESQUISSES POUR LE FAUBOURG ST-LAURENT
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APPENDIX 5: THE MONTREAL ECONOMIC T.I.F. MODEL
BASED ON THE U.S. STRUCTURE
Establish project area feasibility
Determine project area eligibility
Conduct prelim. fIlnancal leasibility
Compiled lIst of prop. owners & values
Resolution declaring area blighted and establishing Intent to create a TIF district
Draft redevelopment plan and TIF finance report
Agreement between City and developer Sal the date ter the public hearing
Public notice of Meet with Certifled mail Publish public
hearing to taxing dists. notice to general hearing
taxing districts (optional) tax payeri notice
Hold public hearing I fHie any objections to plan
Make needed changes to plan 10 day notice before adoption
Pass ordinance adopting plan & approving project area
Adopt TIF ordinance
t
-Pss Necessary debt obligations
t I
Establish tax allocation
Determine initial equalised assessment
Tax increment accumulates
Retire debt obligalions
The TIF Process: Flowchart of Activity
(Paetsch, Dahlstrom. 1990)
Development Interest confirmed
States Ranked by Number of Cities with TIF Districts, 1987
Number of Cities
Rank State with TIF Districts
1. California 467
2. Minnesota 210
3. Michigan 162
4. Wisconsin 130
5. Illinois 36
6. Florida 35
7. Ohio 11
8. Oregon 10
9. Nebraska 7
10. Utah 6
11. North Dakota 6
12. Kentucky 5
13. Maine 5
14. Texas 5
15. Montana 4
16. Nevada 4
17. Rhode Island
18. South Dakota
19. Kansas
20. Oklahoma 1
21. Hawaii 0
22. Mississippi 0
23. New Jersey 0
24. Missouri 0
SOURCE: Adapted from Klemanski (1987).
NOTE: The following states have TIF legislation, but information on the number of cities with TIF districts is
not available: Colorado. Indiana. Iowa, Louisiana, New Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, and Wyoming.
(Paetch, Dahlsotrom. 1990)
Assessed Decreasing assessed Increase in assessed value due
Property value of property in to TIF implementation
Value district
Captured
san is eed
enactedValue
Tax Increment Base Value
-3 0 2 5 10 20
Year
. Following a TIF District over Time
(Paetsch, Dahlstrom. 1990)
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An example of a tax increment formula is:
Tax Increment =
(Current Assessed Value) - (Original Assessed Value) Current
Current Assessed Value
EXAMPLE
(A) Original Assessed Value
(B) Current Assessed Value
(C) Current Taxes
(D) Tax Increment -
Amount of Annual Tax
Payable to Development
Agency
(Burnside. 1981)
51210,455
S2,706,114
S 955,339
$2,706,114 - S1,210,455
$2,706,114 x $955,339
.553 x 955,339
.- $528,302
x Taxes
Tax Increment Potential
Tax Rate 0.080092
Assessed Valuation Rate 0.333333
Projected Inflation Rate .05
Interest Rate Factor .10
Bond Term 20
Summary Year I Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 ........ Year 20
Project revenues
1. Existing market value 1,418,715 1,418,715 1,418,715 1,418,715 ........ 1,418,715
2. Existing assessed value 472,905 472,905 472,905 472,905 ........ 472,905
3. Existing real estate (RE) taxes 757,520 37,876 37,876 37,876 37,876 ........ 37,876
4. Private building development 3,621,563
5. Private site development 0
6. Land value 905,642
7. Estimated market value 1,418,715 1,418,715 4,927,205 5,173,565 ........ 11.293,244
8. Estimated assessed value 472,905 472,905 1,642,402 1,724,522 ........ 3,764,415
9. Estimated RE taxes 3,776,377 37,876 37,876 131,543 138,120 ........ 301,500
10. Projected RE tax increment (annual) 0 0 93,667 100,244 ........ 263,624
11. Total RE tax increment (term) 3,018,857
12. Average annual RE tax increment 150,943
Project costs
13. Land acquisition 844,330
14. Clcarance . 90,000
15. Relocation 104,000
16. Rehabilitation 0
17. On-site improvements 0
18. Off-sitc improvcmcnts 110,000
19. Consulting 15,000
20. Other costs 25,200
21. Gross project costs 1,188,530
22. Less Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) 0
23. Less other sources 0
24. Net project cost 1,188,530
Debt structure
25. Capitalized debt (20-year term) 1,188,530
26. Capitalized debt service (annual) 139,604 139,604 139,604 139,604 ........ 139,604
27. Total TIF debt service (term) 2,792,080
28. TIF bond coverage ratio 1.08
(Paetsch, Dahlstrom. 1990)
PROPOSED T.I.F. ZONE:
ACTUAL EVALUATIONS ACCORDING TO ZONING CATEGORY
ZONING EVALUATIONS
VACANT CONSTRUCTED
COMMERCIAL 3,593,800 64,979,800 60,573,600
SEMI-COMMERCIAL 1,114,800 1,681,900 2,796,700
RESIDENTIAL 3,454,000 7,117,200 10,571,200
GRAND TOTALS 8,162,600 73,778,900 81,941,500
TOTAL
1992 TAX EVALUATIONS FOR
SOURCE: CITY OF MONTREAL TAX ROLE EVALUATIONS
CIVIC ADDRESS ZONING
(in Mas ter
EVALUATION
P Ian)
ST-LAURENT BOULEVARD
1152-
1162-
1166-
1186-
1190-
1195-
1198-
1202-
1203-
1206
1210-
1214-
1215-
1219
1219-
1222 -
1223-
1229
1230
1246-
1406
1410-
1411-
1416-
1421
54
64
82
88
96
1201
1200
04
07
12
20
17
21
28
25
50
12A
17
20
ST-DOMINIQUE BTREET
1209- 11
1215-17
1225
1245
Vacan t
V a c a n t
co m mercia 1
commercial
commercial
commer cial
commer cial
c amme r c i a 1
semi-commercial
commer cial
commercial
commercial
commer cia 1
semi-commercial
commercial
commercial
commercial
commercial
commercial
commercial
commercial
commercial
commer cial
commer cial
commercial
commer ci a 1
c omme r c i a 1
semi-commercial
semi-commercial
commercial
commercial
residential
commercial
( $)
U
LAND
416
146
1,174
199
401
973
194
195
484
187
187
385
245
481
246
385
486
483
262
2,136
576
387
542
406
540
67
33
115
115
252
269
BUILDING
p 6
,400
,200
100
,000
,000
,50 0
,300
,100
,900
,600
,600
,900
,200
,600
,800
,900
,100
,100
,600
,000
,400
,900
300
,600
,300
,500
,800
,600
,700
,000
,400
492
499
1,042
135
31
1, 0 30
213
176
593
152
111
409
158
1,256
415
212
334
517
231
2,414
523
225
158
381
486
600
,900
,500
,800
500
,10 0
,200
,300
,600
,200
800
,300
,200
300
800
.700
900
,400
300
,000
,600
,800
,100
,500
,400
95,900
39,900
143,400
454,400
5,700
TOTAL
909,000
646, 100
2,216,600
334,800
432, 500
2, 00 3, 600
407,500
371,400
1,078,500
339,800
299,400
795,200
403,400
1,737,900
662,600
598,600
821,000
1,000,500
493,900
4,550,000
1,100,000
613,700
700,400
788,100
1, 461, 500
163,400
73,700
259,000
570,100
257,700
269,400
. /2
THE PROPOSED T.I.F. ZONE
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CIVIC ADDRESS ZONING EVALUATION (C)
(in Master Plan)
BERGER STREET
1207-11 residential
1213-17 residential
1218-20 residential
1219-23 residential
Vacant residential
Vacan t residential
DE BULLION STREET
1200-20 residential
1223-27 residential
1228-32 residential
1233-35 residential
1234-38 residential
1237 residential
1240-44 r esiden tial
1245-47 semi-commercial
1410-14 commercial
HOTEL DE VILLE STREET
1221 residential
Vacant residential
1239 cummercial
1243-45 residential
1247-49 r esiden tial
1251-53 residential
STE-ELIZABETH STREET
1173-75 residential
1177-87 residential
1189 residential
1191 residential
1193 residential
1195 residential
1197 residential
1199 residential
1201-03 residential
1205-07 residential
1209-11 residential
1212-18 residential
1213-15 residential
1217 -21 residential
25
31
53
32
315
291
76
42
45
85
38
808
39
90
100
600
900
700
700
800
100
800
500
000
500
700
800
500
600
800
151,
136,
85,
149,
29
55
51
96
80
108
80
47
188
100
200
800
200
.900
,800
,300
700
,600
500
,600
,200
,800
TOTAL
176
168
139
181
315
291
106
98
96
182
119
189
120
137
289
,700
,100
,500
,900
,800
,100
.700
,300
,300
,200
,300
,300
.100
800
,600
429,200 613,800 1,043,000
70,000 70,000
36,000 38,700 74,700
35,200 82,700 117,900
357,700 73,400 109,100
76,000 16,100 83,100
62
99
25
24
25
25
24
24
62
62
62
53
62
62
000
500
200
600
500
000
100
700
300
400
400
100
500
500
104
137
86
85
88
86
83
85
146
59
59
97
60
112
,100
,100
,900
,000
,000
,400
.400
.500
,600
.700
,700
000
300
,300
166
236
112
109
113
111
107
110
208
122
122
150
122
174
100
600
100
600
500
400
500
200
900
100
100
100
800
800
STE-ELIZABETH STREET
CIVIC ADDRESS
(continued)
ZONING
(in Mastex Plan)
1222 residential
1223-27 residential
1224 residential
1226 residential
1228 residential
1229-33 resideutial
1235-39 residential
1241-45 residential
1247-51 residential
1253-57 residential
1265 residential
Vacant residential
Vacant residential
1274 --80 residen tial
1412 residential
1422 r esiden tial
RENE-LEVESQUE BOULEVARD EAST
65-71 commercial
"t commercial
"t commercial
"t commer cial
215 commercial
235-45 commercial
STE-CATHERINE STREET NEST
11-23 c o mnie r cia 
STE-CATHERINE STREET EAST
2-22 commercial
1-19 commercial
55-57 commercial
59-61 commercial
Vacant commercial
60-62 commercial
Vacant commer cial
67-69 commercial
71-75 commercial
77-79 commercial
85-87 commercial
89-103 commer cial
90-94 commercial
EVALUATION ($)
U
LAND.
12,300
62,600
13,300
13,200
14,200
62,600
62,700
62,700
62,800
62,800
111,200
126,300
323,800
95,900
60,000
60,000
140,900
44,600
44,200
47 ,700
547,600
1,281,700
477,000
274,
1,106,
218,
1,264,
65,
46,
582,
123,
129,
238,
262,
322,
1,203,
000
500
500
700
000
900
100
200
900
400
400
900
800
2,03
4, 97
3,77
133,000
361,500
1,493,500
459,900
976,300
50,200
95,000
114,500
225,600
269,800
272,300
215,800
page 3
BU I LDING
I U
TOTAL
70,
142,
70,
65,
70,
140,
167,
70,
106,
140,
656,
45,
80,
120,
700
000
800
100
900
600
800
200
600
000
400
200
000
000
1, 300
6,100
4,900
83,000
204,600
84,100
78,300
85,100
203,200
230,500
132,900
169,400
202,800
915, 100
126,300
323,800
141, 100
140,000
180,000
3,440,300
44,600
44,200
47 ,700
5,523,700
5,056,600
610,000
635,500
2,600,000
678,400
2,241,000
65,000
97,100
582,100
218,200
244,400
464,000
532,200
595,200
1,419,600
... \4400
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STE-CATHERINE STREET EAST (continued)
ZONING
(in Kaster Plan)
100-110 commercial
151-57 commercial
Vacant commercial
Vacant commercial
156-162 commer cial
166-174 commercial
176-182 commercial
179-185 comner cial
200-210 commercial
205-209 commercial
212-14 semi-commercial
216-230 semi-commercial
250-56 commercial
211-223 commercial
CHARLOTTE STREET
57
65-67
101-105
SHDU SITES (city-owned vacant lots)
LOT
LOT
LOT
LOT
LOT
LOT
LOT
LOT
LOT
c omme r c ia
c omme r ci a
semi-commercial
r esiden tial
e semi - c omme r c i a I
seini--comm. & res.
residential
residen tial
semi-commercial
EVALUATION ($)
U
LAND
336
434
173
441
857
433
547
319
482
1, 528
65
200
220
220
50
41
70
1,
14,
6,
10.
15,
10,
12,
1,
2,
240
150
975
036
391
882
339
572
238
600
800
400
400
900
700
500
300
600
60 0
000
000
000
000
600
000
300
400
900
800
600
200
900
700
800
900
BUILDING
347,400
306,600
171, 900
146,500
2,789,100
307,000
694,900
5, 327, 50 0
70,000
800,000
957,500
780,000
116,000
74,200
20,000
TOTAL
684
741
173
441
0 29
580
336
626
177
8 56
135
000
177
000
166
115
90
240
150
975
036
391
882
339
572
238
,000
.400
400
,400
800
.200
,600
, 300
,500
,10 0
.000
.000
,500
,000
400
900
800
600
200
900
700
800
900
TOTALS 37,494,000 44,447,500 81,941,500
CIVIC ADDRESS
T.I.F. ZONE ANALYSIS: CURRENT PROPERTY VALUES AND TAX REVENUES
CUEUEET
EEISTING VACANT TOTAL
CONSTRUCTION LOTS
COEEECIAL:
VALUE $64.979,800 $3.593.00 88,,6
property Tax
$1.72/8100 $1.117,650 661.815 *i,179,465
surtas an
vacant Lots
81.72/$100 -------- 6115 181
Olympic Tax
S.168/$100 6109.165 $6,035
Provincial
Suitas
8.526/$100 8341,795 $18.905 $360,709
school Tag
$.141/$100 891,620 $5,065 *96,88
SUE TOTALS
OF TAEIS 61.660,230 $153.635
03E1-COKEEICIAL:
VALUE 81,681.900 81.114.800 *2.745,7
Property Tax
11.72/ 100 $28.930 619,175 S4 ,4
surtas a
vacant Lots$1.72/*100 -19,175 1171
Olympic Tax
S.077/8100 $1.295 $860 11
Provincial
sE:tax
8.526/6100 6845 5,8165 $14.
school Tax
S.141/1100 $2,370 1,570 ...3, ....4 .
BUE TOTALS
of TiE $41.446 $46,645
333 IDEETIAL:
VALUE $7,117,200 $3.454,000 $10.71,260
Property Tax$1.72/8100 6122.415 *59,410 #111,125
surtax on
Vacant Lots
81.72/8100 ------ *59,410 *19,4Is
Olympic Tax
6.023/6100 $1.635 8795 $2.430
School Tax
$.141/8100 110.035 *4,870 *14.995
ova TOTALS
o TAES $134,085 6124.485 *2*1,174
EZISTING VACANT TOTAL
COUSTEUCTIOU LOTS
GREAND TOTALS
O VALUES 173,778,908 $8,162.680 *S1.941,5#9
GRAND TOTALS
OF TAES $1.835.755 8324,76* $2.160,s20
T. I . F. ZONE ANALYSIS: POTENTIAL PROPERTY VALUES AND TAX REVENUES
POTENTIAL
REOVATIED lug OTUEE TOTAL NE3 TOTAL
PROPERTIES 21T8 1ITE1 CGES2TECTION
COKKEECIAL:I
VALUE 81.224,700 $12,910,500 $28,321,300 $41,231.00 $112,456,50
Property Tax$1.72/8100 *2,15
6258
Sartaz on
vacant Lots
11.72/8100
Olympic Tax8.168/6100 8,78
?rovincial
su tax8.526/8100 44
school Tax
8.141/8100 
#172,44t
533 TOTALS
0 TAzz 
*342R.758
IEEI.-COMEERCIAL:
VALUE $2.102,300 $29,789,100 --------- $29,789,100 
$31,891,48
property Tax$1.72/8100 ,5
48,5S*
surtax on
Vacant Lots
11.72/8100
Olympic Taz 
$245$0
8.077/8100
Provincial
surtax
8.526/8100 
8147,75
School Tas
8.141/8100 
960
333 TOTALS
Of TAEET
RESIDENTIAL:
VALUE $8,096.500 $28,616.800 $14,487,200 $43.104.000 #
52,8800550
Property Tax$1.72/8100 *
54.4#.
surtax on
Vacant Lots
61.72/8100 
----
Olympic Ta.
8.023/100 
311,599
school Tan
8.141/8100 
. 7352*
333 TOTALS
01 TEE ST-8
EEUOVATE3 B333 0T33l TOTAL 3E3
 TOTAL
PROPERTIES SITES BITES CONSTRUCTION
G3ND TOTAL8
Of VALUES 892.223.500 871.316,408 $42,88.500 11
14,124,900 *18.348
6133 TOTALS #4*294,22
9
of TAKES 
*4*
13f
T.I.F. ZONE ANALYSIS:
COMPARISON OF CURRENT AND POTENTIAL PROPERTY VALUES AND TAX REVENU
ES
33131130 VACAT TOTAL 
REOVATED TOTAL 3R TOTAL 
agvyEEEECE
CONSTEUCTION LOTS 
rE02ERTIES IlTgg CONSTRUCTION
COU1UIIU .131313131 
111 CUIC!O
VALUE 664.979.80 $3.593,08 $4,T$71 609 $81.224.760 6
41.231.100 #1454,$6 *653,862.90
292 TOTALS
or TAXES 61.666,230 $153.635 ,$ 
3,#ai5t +1.314.885
O313-COUEECIAL:
VALUE 61.681.960 $1.114.00 12,7*449 62.102.300 629,739.160 131f 1,4 0 +629.394.
706
292 TOTALS
Of TAES 841.440 646.645 s5S,$# 
7 7697.705
REZIEEETIAL:
VALUE 67.117,20 63.454.000 s1o,571,2R* 3.396.500 643,104.0
00 $*2,6*4,50 .641.429,309
333 TOTALS
oF TAXE 13 34.88 6124.483 v258.
 _ __ #979,00 +6721,
110
CURRE3T 
P0TENTIAL
EXISTING VACANT TOTAL RE3OVATEv 
TOTAL R TOTAL 1FFREECE
CONSTRUCTION LOT@ 
PROPERTIES C01 13TRCT03
03RS TOTALS
OF VALUES 673.778.900 86.162.680 *u1. 941 t $92.223.500 $1
14.124.900 *216',14.440 46124.406.900
GRAND TOTALS
Or TAE 1.835755 8324,760 
0$ 2.733.700
ANALYSIS OF SHDU SITES:
COMPARISON OF CURRENT AND POTENTIAL PROPERT
Y VALUES AND TAX REVENUES
CURRENT POTstIAL 
DIrrIzaICR
ToTRa TOTAL
PROPETIE8 (VACANT) PEOPERTIuu (coNuTzuCTED)
COMMECILaL:
VALUE 11,862,500 $12.910,500
Property Tax
$1.72/$100 $32,035 $222,060
surtax an
Vacant Lots$1.72/8100 $32,035 ---------- - 3
Olympic Tax
$.1:6I/6100 $3,130 $21,690
Provincial
surtax8.526/$100 39,800 $67.910 
$5111's
school Tax
8.141/8100 $2,625 $18,205
B01 TOTALS
of TahuI 179.625 $329.865
saI-COmmERCIAL:
TALUE 11,164.800 $29,789.100
property Tax$1.72/1100 $20,035 $512,370 +$4*2,335
Surtax on
Vacant Lots$1.72/$100 $20.035 --------
Olympic Tax
$.077/$100 $900 $22,940
Provincial
nurtax
6.526/S100 86.125 $156.690
school tax
8.141/6100 $1,640 842,000
ovn TotaLS
or TAhEE 048,735 6734.,00+
a213DRETIAL:
TALUE $2.019.300 $21,616.00
Property Tax$1.72/8100 $34.730 $492.210
surtax on
Vacant Lots
61.72/8100 $34,730
Olympic Tax$.023/$100 $465 $6,580
school Tax
S.141/6100 $28 .475 $40 350
S sN TOT&& 
.........
O TAIEI $98.400 $539.140
CURINsT POTEtIAL 2117r223C3
TOTAL TOTAL
PROPXRTraS (Tacant) PROPRtIES (CONstarsaCT)
GRAND TOTALS-
O VALUES 15.046.600 $71.316,460 +6,2see
GRAND TOTALS
or TREND 1226.760 $1.603.005 *S1.3 7445
EFFECT OF THE ADDITION OF TENANT-PAID TAXES ON THE TAX REVENUES
CUuassT
sastsTmo Tacast TOTaL ss:am as TOTaL son TOTe. trvmzsassc
CSUTUIT10 11OT PRSOuTiu* SiTas C65sT36CTt0S
COU IClAL: I
TALON 664.979.800 $3.593.800 86.573.600 $81.224.700 641.231.800 $122.456.500 #653.882.90
883TOTALS
or Taiss 61.666.230 8153.635 81.613.865 63.126,75 @81.314.88s
Ass*toa3 er siarsass a auicAs
ass atts T,:Es
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ASSUMPTIONS MADE:
1. RENTAL VALUE = 10% OF PROPERTY VALUE.
2. VACANCY RATE OF 25% (presently around 17% in Montreal)
3. IN SEMI-COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES, AREA FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES EQUALS
1/6 OF BUILDING WHICH REPRESENTS 1/6 OF TOTAL PROPERTY EVALUATION.
CONCLUSION:
WHEN THE BUSINESS & SERVICES TAX AND THE WATER TAX ARE INCLUDED, THE ANNUAL INCREMENTAL VALUE OF THE
TAXES INCREASES ROUGHLY BY $3.4 MILLION, AN INCREASE OF ROUGHLY $600,000 IN COMPARISON TO THE PREVIOUS
AMOUNT CALCULATED WITHOUT THESE TENANT-PAID TAXES.
POTasT!aL
EFFECT OF LOWER INCREASE IN VALUE OF
RENOVATED PROERTIES ON TAX REVENUES
CURRENT POTENTIAL
ERSIG TCNT TOTAL RENOTATED TOTAL MEN TOTAL DIFFERENCE
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EzI~ INDICATES VALUES AND ANOUNTG TO BE USED n0EN RENOVATION WORK18 AS1U ED TO BE 1154% OF TE ORIGINAL PROPERTY EVALUATION.
CONCLUSION:
A DECREASE OF 10% IN THE VALUE OF RENOVATIONS (IE. 115% EVALUATION RATHER THAN 125%) CAUSES THE ANNUAL
TAX INCREMENT TO DECREASE BY 6.7%, RESULTING IN AN ANNUAL INCREMENTAL TAX INCREASE OF $2,551,155 WHICH
IS $182,545 LESS THAN THE PREVIOUS ESTIMATE OF $2,733,700.
APPENDIX 6: THE CONSEQUENT BOND VALUE AND ITS INCENTIVE USE
TOTAL OF T.I.F. FUND AVAILABLE:
ANNUAL INCREMENTAL VALUE OF THE TAXES COLLECTED IN THE
T.I.F. ZONE HAVE BEEN CALCULATED AT $2,733,700.
THROUGH THE FLOATING OF PUBLIC BONDS, ASSUMED AT 8%
INTEREST ANNUALLY (exact rate to be adjusted to market
demands and expert's recommendation) FOR A DURATION OF
20 YEARS, WITH A YEARLY INPUT OF $2,733,700, THE TOTAL
FUND AVAILABLE IS ROUGHLY
$30,000,000
AS OUTLINED, THE COSTS TO BE ASSUMED BY THIS T.I.F.
CREATED FUND COULD AMOUNT TO $20,000,000. THE
REMAINDER OF THE OF THE FUND COULD THEREFORE POSSIBLY
BE REINVESTED INTO THE ZONE FOR VARIOUS SOCIAL PURPOSES
(SOCIAL HOUSING, COMMUNITY PROGRAMS, HOUSING FOR THE
HOMELESS, CULTURAL PROGRAMS, ETC.) OR IT COULD ALSO BE
SPREAD OUT TO COVER THE MUNICIPAL NEEDS IN OTHER
SECTORS WHICH HAVE NOT BENEFITTED FROM THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A T.I.F. PROGRAM.
EXPLANATION OF COSTS TO BE ASSUMED
BY MONIES RAISED THROUGH THE T.I.F PLAN
A. LAND BOUGHT BY THE CITY TO
CREATE A NEW PUBLIC PARK
(municipal evaluation of land)
B. STREET AND SIDEWALK IMPROVEMENT COSTS,
COST OF LANDSCAPING PUBLIC PARK (assumed)
C. LOSSES OCCURRED IN THE SALE OF
THE CITY-OWNED LANDS (SHDU sites)
a) number of commercial units @
max. sale price of land of $6,500/unit
b) number of residential units @
max. sale price of land of $6,500/unit
units X
$3,806,20
$1,240,400
$3,000,000
= 118 units X
$6,500
= $767,000
= 353
$6,500
= $2,294,500
total max. sale price of land = $3,061,500
cost of land (based on municipal evaluation)
0
LOSS= $744,700
D. SUBSIDIES FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION
a) municipal subsidies of 50% of 25% increase in
current property evaluations of existing buildings
(amount of value increase = cost of renovation work)
.50 X $18,444,700 = $9,222,350
TOTAL OF COSTS $19,634,950
EXPLANATION OF COSTS TO BE ASSUMED
BY MONIES RAISED THROUGH THE T.I.F PLAN
A. LAND BOUGHT BY THE CITY TO CREATE A NEW PUBLIC PARK
Lot #1, 20,672 sq ft
municipal evaluation $1,240,400
B. STREET AND SIDEWALK IMPROVEMENT COSTS,
COST OF LANDSCAPING PUBLIC
$3,000,000
PARK (assumed)
C. LOSSES OCCURRED IN THE SALE OF THE CITY-OWNED LANDS
(SHDU SITES)
-one residential unit is assumed to be equivalent to
1000 square feet in gross area of construction.
-one commercial unit is assumed to be equivalent
to 1000 square feet in gross area of construction.
-maximum sale price for land per residential unit is assumed
to be an average of $6,500.
-maximum sale price for land per commercial unit is
assumed to be an average of $6,500.
-assume that 1992 evaluation is the cost of the land.
LOT #2:
a) max. area of commercial construction
number of commercial units
units
= 73 X $6,500
cost of land
LOSS
max. sale price of land
= 73,450 sq ft
= 73,450 / 1000
= 73 comm.
= $474,500
= $622,100
= ($147,600)
LOT #3:
a) max. area of commercial construction
number of commercial units
units
max. sale price of land
b) max. area of residential construction
sq ft
units
number of residential units
max. sale price of land
= 7,500 sq ft
= 7,500 / 1000
= 7 comm.
= 7 X $6,500
= $45,500
= 37,500
= 37,500 / 1000
= 37 res.
= 37 X $6,500
total max. sale price of land
cost of land
LOSS
= $240,500
= $286,000
= $300,800
= ($14,800)
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LOT #4:
a) max. area of residential construction
number of residential units
units
max. sale price of land
cost of land
LOSS
= 69,740 sq ft
= 69,740 / 1000
= 69 res.
= 69 X $6,500
= $448,500
= $749,100
= ($300,600)
LOT #5:
a) max. area of commercial construction
number of commercial units
units
max. sale price of land
b) max. area of residential construction
number of residential units
units
max. sale price of land
total max. sale price of land
cost of land
LOSS
LOT #6:
a) max. area of commercial construction
number of commercial units
max. sale price of land
b) max. area of residential construction
number of residential units
= 36,400 sq ft
- 36,400 / 1000
= 36 comm.
= 36 X $6,500
- $234,000
= 61,770 sq ft
= 61,770 / 1000
= 61 res.
= 61 X $6,500
= $396,500
= $630,500
= $814,000
= ($183,500)
= 1,600 sq ft
= 1,600 / 1000
= 1 comm. unit
= 1 X $6,500
= $6,500
= 70,736 sq ft
= 70,736 / 1000
= 70 res.
max. sale price of land
total max. sale price of land
cost of land
LOSS
= 70 X $6,500
= $455,000
= $461,500
= $700,900
= ($239,400)
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LOT #7:
a) max. area of residential construction
number of residential units
max. sale price of land
total max. sale price of land
cost of land
PROFIT
- 90,225 sq ft
= 90,225 / 1000
= 90 res.
- 90 X $6,500
= $585,000
= $585,000
= $521,600
= $63,400
LOT #8:
a) max. area of residential construction
number of residential units
units
max. sale price of land
total max. sale price of land
cost of land
PROFIT
= 11,529 sq ft
= 11,529 / 1000
= 11 res.
= 11 X $6,500
= $71,500
= $71,500
= $47,700
= $23,800
LOT #9:
a) max. area of commercial construction
number of commercial units
max. sale price of land
b) max. area of residential construction
= 1,650 sq ft
- 1,650 / 1000
= 1 com. unit
= 1 X $6,500
= $6,500
- 15,210 sq ft
units
units
number of residential units
max. sale price of land
total max. sale price of land
cost of land
PROFIT
= 15,210 / 1000
= 15 res.
= 15 X $6,500
= $97,500
$104,000
$50,000
$54,000
... \4
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OVERALL SHDU SITES:
a) number of commercial units
units
max. sale price of land
b) number of residential units
units
max. sale price of land
total max. sale price of land
cost of land
LOSS
= 118 comm.
= $767,000
= 353 res.
= $2,294,500
= $3,061,500
= $3,806,200
= $744,700
D. SUBSIDIES FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION
-one residential unit is assumed to be equivalent
to 1000 square feet in gross area of construction.
-one commercial unit is assumed to be equivalent
to 1000 square feet in gross area of construction.
-a municipal subsidy average of $6,500 per residential unit
is assumed
-a municipal subsidy average of $6,500 per commercial unit
is assumed
SHDU SITES:
a) number of new commercial units
units
amount of commercial subsidies
= 118 comm.
= 118 X $6,500
units
b) number of new residential units
units
amount of residential subsidies
subtotal in subsidies
OTHER VACANT SITES IN T.I.F. ZONE:
a) number of new commercial units
units
amount of commercial subsidies
b) number of new residential units
units
amount of residential subsidies
subtotal in subsidies
= $767,000
= 353 res.
- 353 X $6,500
- $2,294,500
= $3,061,500
= 148 comm.
= 148 X $6,500
= $962,000
= 98 res.
= 98 X $6,500
= $637,000
= $1,599,000
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TOTALS:
a) number
units
amount
b) number
units
amount
of
of
of
of
new commercial units
commercial subsidies
new residential units
residential subsidies
TOTAL SUBSIDIES FOR NEW CONSTURCTION
= 384 comm.
= 384 X $6,500
= $2,496,000
= 451 res.
= 451 X $6,500
= $2,931,500
= $5,427,500
E. SUBSIDIES FOR RENOVATION WORK
-assume renovation increases current property values by
25%.
-assume increase in evaluation is equivalent to cost of
renovation work.
-assume municipal subsidies are equal to 50% of the cost of
renovation work.
/tv
a) present total evaluation of
existing built properties
b) increase in evaluation of
existing built properties
c) cost of renovation work
d) municipal subsidies for renovation work
= $73,778,900
= .25 X
$73,778,900
= $18,444,700
= $18,444,700
= .50 X
$18,444,700
= $9,222,350
EXPLANATION OF COSTS TO BE ASSUMED
BY MONIES RAISED THROUGH THE T.I.F PLAN
A. LAND BOUGHT BY THE CITY TO
CREATE A NEW PUBLIC PARK
(municipal evaluation of land)
B. STREET AND SIDEWALK IMPROVEMENT COSTS,
COST OF LANDSCAPING PUBLIC PARK (assumed)
C. LOSSES OCCURRED IN THE SALE OF
THE CITY-OWNED LANDS (SHDU sites)
a) number of commercial units @
max. sale price of land of $6,500/unit
b) number of residential units @
max. sale price of land of $6,500/unit
units X
$1,240,400
$3,000,000
= 118 units X
$6,500
= $767,000
= 353
$6,500
= $2,294,500
total max. sale price of land = $3,061,500
cost of land (based on municipal evaluation)
$3,806,200
LOSS= $744,700
D. SUBSIDIES FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION
a) municipal subsidies of 50% of 25% increase in
current property evaluations of existing buildings
(amount of value increase = cost of renovation work)
.50 X $18,444,700 = $9,222,350
TOTAL OF COSTS $19,634,950
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